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More Than a Witness: The Role of Custodial
Parents in the IV-D Child Support Process
by Stacy Brustin*
I. Introduction
The current system for collecting and enforcing child
support through state IV-D agencies' threatens the rights
of parents who have custody or caretaking responsibility
for children entitled to support. In many states, custodial
parents who avail themselves of government child
support services, or who are required to assign their right
to collect child support to the state as a condition of
receiving public assistance, unknowingly relinquish their
authority to determine what is in their child's best
*2interests. State agencies initiate child support cases,
advocate for financial and medical support in adminis-
trative and judicial proceedings, and make decisions that
affect the physical and economic well-being of children.
3
Yet, the agency and its attorneys do not represent the
custodial parent or the individual child entitled to
support; rather, they represent the state and its interests.
The legal status of the custodial parent in these govern-
ment child support cases is often unclear and the due
process protections afforded to them vary. Rather than
deeming custodial parents as parties to these cases,
federal and state laws are frequently silent or ambiguous
on the question of party status. This ambiguity paves the
way for government attorneys, courts, and administrative
tribunals to treat custodial parents as little more than
witnesses in cases that fundamentally affect the well-
being of their children.
Government-initiated child support cases typically
involve parents whose parental rights are intact and have
not been terminated.4 The custodial parents (one or both)
retain the right to make fundamental decisions regarding
the rearing of their children; yet, for financial reasons,
they are required to either assign their right to collect
support to the government or turn to the government to
assist them in collecting support because they cannot
afford a private attorney.5 The decision to turn to the
government for public benefits or to seek government
assistance in bringing a child support action is one that
low-income custodial parents pursue in order to enable
their families to subsist.
Parents often do not understand the role of IV-D
6child support agencies. States uniformly take the
position that the child support agency and government
attorneys working on IV-D cases represent the interest of
the state and not the interest of either parent or any
individual child.7 A host of state statutes, administrative
regulations, and agency policies specify that no attorney-
client relationship exists between the attorneys employed
or contracted by state child support agencies and the
parents utilizing IV-D services. 8 Courts have upheld
these representation statutes9 and several state ethics
boards have determined that the statutes and rules
comport with ethical standards governing lawyers.' 0
While the role of the state child support agency in
IV-D cases is clear, there is far less clarity as to the role
that custodial parents play in these cases. If the IV-D
agency represents the interests of the state, then who
represents the interests of the individual child at issue? Is
the custodial parent a party to the case or merely a
potential witness for the state's case? Does she have a
right to receive notice of and participate in
administrative or judicial proceedings concerning her
child? Does she have a right to seek review of decisions
in IV-D cases concerning paternity, child support, or
medical support? Does a custodial parent's status or right
to due process change depending upon whether she has
assigned her rights to collect support to the state or
voluntarily requested IV-D child support services?
Child support statutes, court rules, and child support
agency websites in twenty jurisdictions were reviewed
for this article in an effort to answer these questions."
This review revealed differences among jurisdictions in
several areas including: (i) under what circumstances
custodial parents must assign their child support rights to
the state and how the state defines such an assignment;'
2
(ii) whether custodial parents are considered parties to
the IV-D support action;' 3 (iii) the due process rights
afforded to custodial parents;' 4 (iv) the degree of
involvement custodial parents are entitled to have in
mediation and judicial/administrative adjudication of IV-
D cases;15 and (v) the thoroughness and clarity of
information provided to parents concerning the
relationship between the state child support agency and
the custodial parent.
16
The need for custodial parents to have a voice in
administrative and judicial proceedings involving
support for their children is critical because the interests
of the state child support agency and the parent
frequently diverge in fundamental ways. While state
agencies have an interest in ensuring that children in
each state are supported by their parents, the state is
particularly focused on collecting child support to
(i) reimburse the government for funds expended on
public assistance and (ii) prevent families not currently
receiving public assistance from having to seek it in the
future.17 These agencies receive significant funding from
the federal government. Agency performance is
measured by federal standards that financially reward or
penalize states based on criteria such as the number of
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child support orders established in a given year.18 These
standards do not evaluate the quality of support orders
issued. In contrast, parents have both liberty interests and
pecuniary interests at stake in child support cases.
Parents seek to collect an appropriate amount of child
support for their family, obtain health care coverage that
is appropriate for the needs of their particular children,
maintain familial relationships, and protect themselves
and their children from harm. Without according
custodial parents party status and providing them with a
meaningful opportunity to participate in the adjudication
of IV-D cases, the needs and interests of children are not
adequately represented.
This article argues that when state agencies, courts,
or administrative tribunals treat custodial parents as
witnesses rather than as interested and necessary parties
to IV-D cases, the state impinges upon the due process
rights of parents to rear their children and to act in a
representational capacity on behalf of their children.
Although it may not be appropriate for the state and its
attorneys to enter into an attorney-client relationship
with a parent seeking assistance in securing child
support, it is equally inappropriate, and arguably uncon-
stitutional, for the state to assume full authority to deter-
mine what is in the best interests of children whose
parents retain the legal authority to make decisions
concerning their well-being.
Part II of the article provides an overview of the
federal and state child support enforcement process and
analyzes the obligation of parents to assign their right to
collect child support to state IV-D agencies. Part III
explores the relationship between IV-D agencies and
custodial parents and identifies the conflicts that can
arise between them. Part IV surveys state practices
regarding the accordance of party status and due process
protection to custodial parents in JV-D cases. It also
evaluates the information state agencies provide to
parents to educate them about these issues. Part V argues
that custodial parents are indispensable parties who must
be joined in IV-D actions. Finally, Part VI offers a series
of recommendations for preserving the rights of parents
to protect the interests of their children in IV-D cases.
II. Government Child Support
Services
1. Responsibilities of IV-D Agencies
During the last thirty years, the federal government and
the states have invested significant resources into child
support collection.' 9 Lawmakers recognized that there
were many children dependent upon public assistance
who failed to receive the child support to which they
were entitled and Congress determined that the
government should be actively involved in establishing
paternity and securing support. In 1975, Congress
enacted the Child Support Enforcement Program,
codified as Title IV-D of the Social Security Act (IV-D
program). 21 The initial goals of the IV-D program were
to ensure that children in poverty received child support
and to enable the government to use child support
enforcement as a means for recouping monies spent
through public assistance programs.22 The stated goals of
the program have evolved and according to the National
Child Support Enforcement Strategic Plan for 2005-
2009, "[c]hild support is no longer primarily a welfare
reimbursement, revenue-producing device for the
Federal and State governments; it is a family-first
program, intended to ensure families' self-sufficiency by
making child support a more reliable source of
income. 23
Under Title IV-D, and as a condition of receiving
federal welfare funds, states are required to develop and
implement a state plan for providing child support
collection and enforcement services. 24 Each IV-D agency
is required to offer "services relating to the establishment
of paternity or the establishment, modification, or
enforcement of child support obligations. 25 States have
enacted statutes or rules of procedure authorizing state
IV-D agencies, including attorneys employed or
contracted by the state, to bring legal actions to establish
paternity and collect child support.26
Title 1V-D mandates that all individuals who
currently receive welfare benefits on behalf of children1
7
or who have received welfare benefits in the past, assign
their right to collect child support to the state." Each
state must provide child support services to these
families. 29 The law also requires that IV-D agencies
make their services available to parents who have never
received public assistance.30 The objective of extending
services to non-welfare families is to assist those
families in securing child support and prevent them from
needing public assistance in the future.
3'
Every state and the District of Columbia has a IV-D
child support enforcement program.32 IV-D programs are
typically housed in the state Human Services Depart-
ment, Treasury Department, or Attorney General's
Office.33 They handle more than fifteen million
paternity/child support cases every year. 34 About seven-
teen percent of these cases involve low-income single
parents who receive public cash assistance such as
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF).35
Approximately forty-seven percent of the caseload is
comprised of former recipients of public assistance, and
non-public assistance cases comprise thirty-six percent
of the caseload. 36 The overwhelming majority of IV-D
cases involve custodial parents or caretakers who are
entitled to receive most or all of the support collected by
the government. 37 If child support services through IV-D
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agencies were unavailable to these individuals, few
would be able to find legal representation because of the
38shortage of free or low-cost legal assistance programs.
IV-D agencies and their attorneys only handle
issues concerning paternity, child support, and health
insurance coverage.39 They do not litigate issues
concerning custody, visitation, property division, or
divorce.40 IV-D agencies seek to establish, modify, or
enforce orders that determine: paternity, amount of
prospective and retroactive support owed, amount of
arrearage owed, method of payment of support, and
health insurance coverage for children.41
States use a judicial process, an administrative
process,42 or a combination of both to establish paternity
43and enforce child support orders. In judicial process
states, courts adjudicate paternity and support actions.
Government lawyers typically represent the IV-D agency
in court proceedings. 44 In states that use an
administrative process, IV-D agency staff or
administrative hearing officers determine support order
amounts and adjudicate uncontested and, in some
jurisdictions, contested cases.4 s In these administrative
systems, the involvement of attorneys is generally
46minimal. Some states use a combination of both
47judicial and administrative processes.
2. Assignment of Rights
Federal law requires that as a condition of receiving
federal funding for child support and public assistance
programs, states must mandate that benefits recipients
assign their right to collect child support to the state.48
Federal statutes and regulations are less explicit about
whether custodians who do not receive public assistance
must assign their rights even though any money
collected would be distributed to the recipient. The
language of several regulations suggests that such an
assignment is not required or anticipated.49
Pursuant to federal law, states have enacted statutes
and regulations requiring assignments in public
assistance cases.50 For example, in Florida, all recipients
of public assistance s* must assign to the IV-D agency
"any right, title, and interest to support the recipient may
be owed., 5 2 In addition, "[t]he recipient of public
assistance appoints the department as her or his attorney
in fact to act in her or his name, place, and stead to
perform specific acts relating to the establishment of
paternity or the establishment, modification, or
enforcement of support obligations. ' 3 The statute
requires that the IV-D agency "be subrogated to the right
of the dependent child or person having the care,
custody, and control of the child to prosecute or maintain
any support action or action to determine paternity or
execute any legal, equitable, or administrative remedy
existing under the laws of the state to obtain
reimbursement. 54 Florida courts have clarified that once
a caretaker accepts public assistance, all authority to
proceed with child support remedies once available to
the custodial parent transfers to the child support5
agency.
In many states, once an individual stops receiving
public assistance, the assignment ends. In Colorado, for
example, so long as arrearage is owed for public
assistance previously paid to the family, the right to
56collect remains assigned to the state. However, once an
individual stops receiving public assistance and all
arrearage is paid, the state no longer acts as assignee to
collect the support.
57
Some states require that custodial parents in non-
public assistance cases assign their support rights as a
condition of receiving IV-D services.5 8 The custodial
parent and the children receive any child support
payments collected but the state serves as the
intermediary for collecting and enforcing the support
obligation. 9 In Arkansas, for example, those receiving
public assistance as well as those who do not receive
benefits assign their rights to support to the state. 60 In
Texas, courts have held that when a parent applies for
IV-D services, regardless of whether the applicant is
receiving public assistance or not, the applicant assigns
the right to establish and enforce child support and
medical support to the Attorney General.6'
Regardless of whether or not the custodial parent is
required to assign their rights to support, the IV-D
agency and its attorneys are obligated to represent the
interests of the state, not the interests of the parent. This
limitation is particularly significant given the fact that
the parent's interests in a IV-D case often differ from
and sometimes conflict with the interests of the state.
III. The Relationship Between
IV-D Agencies and Custodial
Parents-Divergent Interests to
Protect
1. Who Does the IV-D Agency Represent?
Prior to 1988, the relationship between agency attorneys
and parents seeking assistance on child support cases
was ambiguous. Some IV-D agencies viewed themselves
62as representing custodial parents. They took the
position that attorneys for the state child support agency
could enter into attorney-client relationships with
custodial parents on whose behalf they collected
63support. Other agencies did not take a clear position as
to whether they represented the custodial parent.64
However, the parameters of the relationship between the
IV-D agency and custodial parents became the subject of
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much concern following the enactment of the Family
Support Act of 1988.
The Family Support Act required state TV-D
agencies to develop procedures for reviewing and
modifying child support orders at the request of either a
custodial or a non-custodial parent. 65 Agency attorneys
feared that conflicts of interest would arise if the agency
were initially to represent the custodial parent and then
later assist the non-custodial parent in seeking a
66modification. Early ethics opinions were inconsistent
and did not provide attorneys guidance regarding
whether assistance to both parents put attorneys in the
ethically impermissible position of representing two
67parties with adverse interests. Ultimately, the Federal
Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) took the
position that IV-D attorneys represent the agency in
68administrative and judicial support proceedings. States
began to change their representation policies to conform
to the OCSE position, often codifying these policies in
69state statutes and regulations.
At least forty-three states now have laws or policies
clarifying that the IV-D agency does not represent either
the custodial or non-custodial parent.7° These states take
the position that because the state child support agency
and its attorneys do not represent the custodial parent,
the state is not required to maintain the same level of
confidentiality as would an attorney representing the
parent. In Oregon, for example, the child support agency
is authorized to share information with other government
agencies if such sharing will assist in an investigation,
prosecution, or civil proceeding. 71 Therefore, if the state
agency receives information concerning TANF or
Medicaid fraud, it may disclose such information.
Massachusetts permits the IV-D agency to disclose
personal data to any state or federal public assistance
program if the information is necessary for the
72administration of such program. In Florida, statutes
authorize the IV-D agency to report information
concerning individuals receiving child support services
to other government agencies or officials if the
information concerns "known or suspected instances of
physical or mental injury, child abuse, sexual abuse or
exploitation, or negligent treatment or maltreatment of a
child who is the subject of a support enforcement activity
under circumstances which indicate that the child's
health or welfare is threatened.,
73
Courts in several states have interpreted represen-
tation statutes and have upheld the position that IV-D
agency attorneys represent the State, not the parents. The
Supreme Court of Arkansas, for example, determined
that the Arkansas representation statute is unambiguous
in its intent to negate any attorney/client relationship
between the OCSE attorney and the custodial or non-
custodial parent. 74 The court found that once the
custodian assigns the right to collect support, the
obligation is owed to the state. 75 The state, according to
the court, has a pecuniary interest in obtaining financial
assistance for children and obviating the need for
custodians to seek public assistance in the future.76 The
court concluded that the state is the client and agency
attorneys represent the state's interest and not the
assignor's interest. 77 Therefore, the court found that no
conflict of interest arises when the state enforces a
father's support rights against a mother and later
enforces the mother's support rights against the father. 8
State ethics panels have also addressed the
representation question. Many have found it ethically
permissible for the IV-D attorney to represent the agency
rather than one of the parents. 79 Some of these opinions
suggest, however, that even if a statute expressly limits
the role of the agency attorney, a government attorney
cannot solely rely on the statute to determine whether an
attorney/client relationship exists. In Kentucky, for
example, the state legislature enacted a statute clarifying
that IV-D agency attorneys represent the state and do not
have an attorney-client relationship with applicants for
IV-D services.80 However, the Kentucky Bar ethics panel
cautioned that the courts, rather than the legislature, had
the authority to regulate the legal profession, and the
courts had not yet interpreted the Kentucky statute. 8'
Therefore, the ethics panel cautioned that an attorney
could not rely on the statute to define the relationship
and instead, an attorney must determine whether a
reasonable person would understand that an attorney-
client relationship existed between the applicant and the
attorney. 82 In order to reduce the likelihood of forming
an attorney-client relationship, the board advised
attorneys to fully discuss the attorney's role with the
applicant, explain the ramifications regarding confiden-
tiality and attorney-client privilege, and provide a written
explanation of the issue to every applicant for IV-D
services.8 3
In theory, the representation policy adopted by
OCSE and implemented in many states offers a
reasonable way for states to assist in collecting and
enforcing child support while maintaining their obliga-
tion to protect public, rather than individual, interests. It
seems awkward at best, and unethical at worst, to have
attorneys who work for the state represent private
individuals whose interests might diverge and conflict
with those of the government. Yet, in practice, the
boundaries between government child support attorneys
or agency personnel and custodial parents are not as
clearly drawn or understood. Furthermore, even if the
representation boundaries are clear, questions remain as
to the ability of unrepresented custodial parents to
protect their interests and the interests of their children in
IV-D cases, particularly when these interests diverge
from those of the government.
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2. Child Support Agencies and Custodial
Parents Have Divergent Interests to Protect
in IV-D Cases
Custodial parents have the legal right to make
childrearing decisions that they believe are in the best
interests of their children and to act in a representative
capacity on behalf of their children to protect these
interests. For biological and adoptive parents, this right
to rear children is a substantive due process right
84protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. As early as
1944, the Supreme Court stated that "[i]t is cardinal with
us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside
first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom
include preparation for obligations the state can neither
supply nor hinder., 85 The Supreme Court has deemed
parents' rights to raise their children as "rights far more
precious... than property rights." 
86
The Court has recognized the "fundamental liberty
interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and
management of their child. 87  This liberty interest
"derives from blood relationship, state-law sanction, and
basic human right.",88 Parents have a fundamental right to
control the rearing of their children and the state can
only interfere with this right when there is a compelling
state interest, such as the need to protect the physical
safety of children. 89 Courts, for example, have found that
parents have a right to make decisions about how to
educate their children, whether through public schools,
private schools, or home instruction. 90 These constitu-
tionally protected rights are often referred to as the rights
of family integrity.9' Courts have recognized that
childrearing and family life are part of a private sphere
of familial association.
92
Several issues arise in the administrative or judicial
processing of IV-D cases that implicate a parent's right
to rear children and act in a representative capacity to
protect the children's interests. For example, the decision
to establish paternity is an action that fundamentally
affects the way in which a child will be reared. Parents
often pursue paternity establishment in order to protect
the child's interests. These interests include the right to
receive financial and medical support, the right to
inheritance, and the interest in establishing a full medical
history accessible to the child in case of medical
emergency. The state, on the other hand, typically
pursues paternity in order to reduce dependence on
public assistance and to qualify for federal incentive
payments. 93 While both the parent and the state may be
seeking paternity, there are distinct interests to protect
that influence the strategies each would adopt and the
effort they exert to establish paternity. The state has a
strong interest in establishing paternity in as many cases
as possible in order to qualify for federal incentive
payments and avoid federal penalties.94 In cases in which
it becomes difficult to locate or serve the putative father,
the state may simply move on to other cases, whereas the
custodial parent, in an effort to protect the child's
interests, would advocate in an administrative or judicial
proceeding that efforts to locate the father continue. 95
Once paternity is established, the IV-D agency
seeks to establish child support and health insurance
coverage for the child. Once again, the interests of the
parent can diverge significantly from those of the state.
For example, in cases involving custodial parents whose
families receive Medicaid, the state is mandated to
pursue child support orders that require the non-custodial
parent to provide health insurance through an employ-
ment benefit plan or through an individual plan if a
reasonably priced option is available. 96 The state seeks
to move as many families as possible off Medicaid and
into private health insurance plans.97 A custodial parent,
however, may have a valid interest in keeping the child
on Medicaid. In many cases, particularly those involving
low-income non-custodial parents, switching a child
from Medicaid to private insurance can cause great
instability and discontinuity of care for the child. The
non-custodial parent may have a long history of seasonal
change of employment or may have a pattern of leaving
jobs after short periods of time. By the time the child is
taken off Medicaid and placed on private insurance, the
non-custodial parent may no longer be employed and the
child's ability to secure medical care can be com-
promised. Similarly, children may be able to obtain
certain medical services under Medicaid that are not
available, or are only available at considerable expense,
under private insurance plans. 98 A parent would need to
advocate for these interests because she cannot rely on
the state to do so.
The IV-D agency also pursues medical support in
non-public assistance cases. Federal law requires
agencies to inform applicants for IV-D services that the
agency will petition the court or administrative authority
to require the non-custodial parent to provide
employment-related or group health insurance. 99 Once
medical support is secured, the agency is to "provide the
custodial parent with information pertaining to the health
insurance policy which has been secured for the
dependent child(ren) pursuant to an order obtained."' °
The state agency is required to consult with the custodial
parent and "promptly select from available plan options
when the plan administrator reports that there is more
than one option available under the plan."'' 0 1 However,
the regulation does not define the term "consultation"
and it permits the state agency to select the plan. The
custodial parent may have valid reasons for preferring
one form of coverage over another, based on price,
services covered, or providers offered under different
plans. She should have the opportunity, from the outset
of the case, to participate as a party in any informal
Vol. 26 . No. 4 * Winter 2006
Stacy Brustin
conferences or formal proceedings in which health care
decisions are made, rather than receiving notice of the
medical support decision after an order has been entered
or after the state agency has selected a plan.
In addition to health care considerations, there may
be issues concerning relationships among family
members, which the custodial parent has a right and an
obligation to raise in paternity and support cases. 102 The
state may not be aware of these concerns or the agency
may be prevented from delving into issues considered
outside the scope of paternity and support. For example,
there may a history of domestic violence that the
custodial parent failed to raise at the outset of a IV-D
case. However, once the case proceeds to a hearing, the
custodial parent may fear that pursuing child support will
incite violence or danger. These issues directly impact
the safety and well-being of the child and a custodial
parent has a strong interest in raising these issues before
a court or an administrative tribunal adjudicating the IV-
D case.
At the other end of the spectrum, a custodial parent
may have a strong interest in facilitating the relationship
between the non-custodial parent and the children. A
custodial parent might believe that the strategy the IV-D
agency is pursuing is adversely affecting the ability of
the non-custodial parent to have visitation with the
children or harming the relationship between the
child[ren] and the non-custodial parent. A custodial
parent may want to negotiate for an amount of support
that falls outside of the state child support guideline, or
she may have proposals for alternative ways in which
child support can be paid (such as in-kind payments for
school or childcare) that will facilitate a relationship
between the children and the non-custodial parent. The
state's interest in collecting support and reimbursing
payment for public assistance may conflict with the
custodial parent's interest in preserving familial
relationships or ensuring protection of family members.
The custodial parent should have the opportunity to
participate in proceedings and raise these concerns on
her own behalf and on behalf of the child.
Custodial parents also have pecuniary interests to
protect in IV-D child support actions. The overwhelming
majority of IV-D cases involve custodial parents who
never have had or no longer receive public assistance.
Because they are entitled to receive support collected by
the state, they have a direct financial interest in the
outcome of IV-D cases. In addition, they may be entitled
to collect arrearage that has accumulated as well as
retroactive support for a period of time subsequent to the
birth of the child and prior to the establishment of a
formal support order.' 
0 3
In public assistance cases, custodial parents retain a
financial interest in the case even though they have
assigned their rights to support to the State. First of all,
many states provide for a monetary pass-through, by
which the custodian receives a share of any money
collected in a given month. 1°4 Additionally, the parent is
entitled to receive any amount collected in excess of the
amount the state pays in public assistance. 10 5 Finally, a
parent who receives public assistance has an interest in
securing a strong child support order because her ability
to collect public assistance is often time-limited. At any
point, the custodial parent can choose to leave the TANF
program. Indeed, federal and state time-limit require-
ments mandate that a custodial parent lose eligibility for
TANF benefits after a limited period.106 As soon as a
custodial parent leaves the TANF program (whether
voluntarily or as a result of time limits), she is entitled to
receive any child support payments collected in the
month following her exit from the program. 1
07
Given their pecuniary interests in IV-D cases,
custodial parents, particularly those who do not receive
public assistance, have a strong incentive to advocate for
support orders that truly reflect the ability of both parents
to contribute. However, states receive federal incentive
payments or penalties based upon the number of child
support orders established and the number of cases in
which the state is collecting support.108 The state is not
rewarded for establishing adequate or strong child
support orders based on thorough investigation and
documentation of parental income. Therefore, the state
has a significant incentive to establish as many child
support orders as possible rather than establishing
adequate child support orders. This state interest can
directly conflict with the interest of a custodial parent.
In cases involving lower income non-custodial
parents, the automated mechanisms IV-D agencies use to
locate salary and asset information are least likely to
succeed. This is particularly true for non-custodial
parents who are self-employed, work sporadically in
seasonal or temporary jobs, or are paid in cash. It is
custodial parents who frequently have contacts or
information regarding the non-custodial parent's work
situation. Although custodial parents are asked to report
any new information they have concerning the
employment of the non-custodial parent to the IV-D
agency, custodial parents can encounter difficulty when
they try to communicate such information to state child
support agencies or agency attorneys. 10 9 Even if the
agency receives leads on where a non-custodial parent
may be employed, agencies often do not have the
resources or the infrastructure to undertake the labor-
intensive investigation required to establish salary
information for a non-custodial parent in a seasonal, self-
employed, or sporadic employment situation. If the state
has failed to adequately investigate or prepare a case for
hearing and intends to settle for too little or go forward
with the evidence it has, then a custodial parent has an
interest in objecting to the settlement and requesting that
Children's Legal Rights Journal
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additional discovery be done or additional witnesses be
called to prove that a non-custodial parent has more
income than the state is prepared to demonstrate.
Custodial parents' interest in seeking retroactive
child support may conflict with the interests of the IV-D
agency. State statutes and caselaw concerning retroactive
support vary, with some states limiting retroactive
support to a two or three-year period prior to the
establishment of an order" 0 and others allowing
custodial parents to seek support from the date of birth of
the child."' The amount of retroactive support owed to a
custodial parent can be substantial. However, a state
agency may decline to pursue retroactive support
because it can be difficult and time-consuming to estab-
lish.112 The custodial parent should have an opportunity
to pursue retroactive support and protect the child's
pecuniary interest even if the state agency declines to
seek retroactive support.
Finally, the state agency may be assisting different
custodial parents in obtaining child support from the
same non-custodial parent. The state is obligated to seek
financial and medical support for each custodial parent
and to allocate any money collected from the non-
custodial parent among all custodial parents."l3 The state
is not permitted to advocate for the potentially
conflicting interests of each custodial parent.'14
However, each custodial parent has an interest in
advocating for the specific needs of her family-interests
that the state agency cannot be relied upon to protect.
IV. The Ability of Custodial
Parents to Protect Their Interests
and the Interests of Their Children
in IV-D Cases Varies Among States
The ability of custodial parents to protect their interests
and the interests of their children in IV-D cases depends
upon whether they are considered parties, whether they
are accorded due process rights, and whether they
understand their role in the IV-D process. Among the
twenty states reviewed for this article,115 there is no
uniformity concerning the party status of custodial
parents. In most states, the party status is ambiguous and
is related to whether the custodial parent has executed an
assignment of rights to collect support. In a few states,
custodial parents are considered parties." 6 The due
process rights accorded to the custodial parent, including
the degree to which a custodial parent/caretaker may
participate in a IV-D child support case concerning his or
her child, often depend upon whether or not the custodial
parent is considered a party to the IV-D action. The
explanations that IV-D agencies provide to custodial
parents concerning the representation policies of the
agency, conflicts of interest, confidentiality, and rights of
custodial parents in IV-D cases are often insufficient to
enable parents to protect their own interests.
1. Party Status Accorded to Custodial
Parents Under Federal and State Law
While government child support agencies are considered
parties to IV-D cases, federal law, state law, and agency
policy across the country are far less explicit as to
whether custodial parents are considered parties to a IV-
D action. In a lawsuit, an individual or entity who is
considered a party is generally entitled to notice, an
opportunity to participate in a proceeding, and the right
to seek review of a lower court or administrative
decision. These due process protections enable the party
to protect his or her interests in the legal action. The
custodial parent's party status in IV-D cases is often
ambiguous; therefore, her ability to protect her interests
and the interests of her children is limited.
Section IV-D of the Social Security Act ("the Act")
and its implementing regulations intermittently refer to
"parties" but the term is never defined. Some provisions
seem to accord party status to custodial parents while
others do not. For example, the Act requires states to
provide notice of all proceedings involving establish-
ment or modification of support to "individuals who are
applying for or receiving services under the State plan,
or who are parties to cases in which services are being
provided under the State plan."" 7 The language makes
clear that an individual who applies for or receives IV-D
services is not necessarily considered a party to the case.
Yet, there are other sections of the Act that suggest that
custodial parents are parties to certain types of IV-D
actions. The provisions concerning review and
adjustment of support orders specify that every three
years, either the parent or the state (if there is an
assignment in place) may request a review and
adjustment of a child support order.' If the IV-D
agency applies a cost of living adjustment or uses auto-
mated methods to adjust a support order, then the statute
requires procedures permitting "either party to contest
the adjustment."" 9 Therefore, for purposes of requesting
a review or contesting an adjustment, the custodial
parent is referred to as a party. 20
Federal regulations concerning state IV-D programs
suggest that the custodial parent could be considered a
party in expedited administrative and judicial processes
for determining paternity and support. The regulations
state that the due process rights of "parties" must be
protected and that all "parties" are to be provided copies
of any paternity determinations or support orders.'
2'
However, the regulations neither define the term "party"
nor require that the custodial parent be a party to these
proceedings. They leave open the possibility that a state
could establish an expedited process in which only the
non-custodial parent and the state agency are considered
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parties entitled to due process protection. 22 Overall, the
term "party" is inconsistently applied to custodial
parents, leaving their party status under federal law
unclear.
Under state law and agency policy, the party status
of the custodial parent is often ambiguous and in at least
one jurisdiction, the custodial parent is not considered a
party. In Washington, D.C., the IV-D agency takes the
position that custodial parents are not parties to matters
initiated or enforced by the IV-D agency.' 23 Instead,
custodial parents are considered witnesses unless a court
has authorized the parent to intervene in the IV-D
action. 24 The agency policy regarding party status of
custodial parents is not codified in any statutes or
administrative regulations.
Many states do not explicitly or clearly address the
party status of the custodial parent in state statutes,
regulations, or IV-D agency materials.' In Massachu-
setts, for example, the IV-D agency is authorized to file a
support action involving a public assistance recipient in
the name of the recipient, in the name of the department,
or in the name of both. 26 In cases involving non-public
assistance applicants for IV-D services, the agency may
file an action in the name of the individual applicant.'
27
These provisions concerning the filing of an action
suggest that the custodian is considered a party, at least
in non-public assistance cases. However, there is no
explicit discussion in these provisions of party status in
support proceedings. The New York IV-D agency takes
the position that in IV-D cases, the petitioner in a non-
TANF case is the custodial parent, guardian, or
caretaker, whereas in a TANF case, the petitioner is the
Social Service Commissioner of the local department of
social services. 28 It is not clear whether the custodial
parent is also considered a party in TANF cases, though
provisions regarding notice suggest that custodial parents
are not deemed to be parties to the action.
29
A few states have adopted statutes and regulations
that expressly discuss the party status of custodial
parents. In Oregon, for example, custodial parents owed
support are considered parties in judicial as well as
administrative proceedings involving IV-D cases.1 30 In
California, when the child support agency initiates a
child support action, the parent who requested or
receives the IV-D services is not considered a necessary
party to the action. 3 ' The agency is authorized by statute
to subpoena the parent as a witness. However, once a
permanent or temporary order for child support or
medical support is entered, the parent receiving services
from the IV-D agency becomes a party to the action.
132
2. Due Process Rights Afforded to Custodial
Parents in IV-D Cases
A. Notice
Federal law requires that every state, as a condition of
receiving federal funding, provide individuals who
receive IV-D services, as well as parties to IV-D cases,
with notice of any proceeding in which support may be
established or modified.133 In addition, the state agency
must provide a copy of any order establishing or
modifying a support order.' 34 Neither the statute nor
regulations discuss how notice is to be effectuated nor do
they explain what constitutes a "proceeding." It is not
clear, for example, whether a proceeding is a formal
administrative or judicial hearing or whether a custodial
parent would be entitled to notice of informal
conferences, negotiations, or automated processes by
which the agency establishes child support obligations.
Federal regulations require that in expedited adminis-
trative or judicial processes, "[t]he due process rights of
the parties involved must be protected"'35 and "[t]he
parties must be provided a copy of the voluntary
acknowledgment of paternity, paternity determination,
and/or support order.' 36 However, the regulations do not
specify whether the custodial parent is considered a party
or delineate the due process rights that must be afforded
to parties.
State rules and practices regarding providing notice
to the custodial parent in IV-D cases vary. 137 Not
surprisingly, in the states where the custodial parent is
automatically considered a party or becomes a party
during the course of a child support action, the notice
requirements are strict. In Oregon, for example, the IV-D
agency must provide notice of child support proceedings
as well as findings of financial responsibility to the
custodial parent. 138 Notice may be effectuated through
regular mail. 139 California law goes further and requires
that once a custodial parent becomes a party to the IV-D
action, the agency or the Attorney General is required to
provide written notice to the custodial parent/caretaker of
the date, time, and purpose of every civil paternity or
support hearing. 140 The IV-D agency is also required to
serve the recipient of IV-D services with all pleadings
regarding paternity and support served on the agency by
any other party.' 4' In states where the party status of
custodial parents is more ambiguous, the statutes or
regulations concerning notice to the custodial parent
typically track federal law.
142
Some state statutes authorize different types of
notice for custodial and non-custodial parents. In Florida,
for example, when the IV-D agency commences an
administrative action, it must provide both parents with a
notice of proceeding to establish an administrative
support order.' 43 Such notice is mailed by regular mail to
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the last known address of the custodial parent.'"
However, the non-custodial parent is served with this
notice by certified mail or any other means permitted in
a civil action. 45 If an administrative support order is
entered by the department or by an administrative law
judge, a copy of the order is to be sent, by regular mail,
to both parents. However, only the non-custodial parent
is notified of the right to seek judicial review of the
order.' 46 Other states, such as New York, place the onus
on the custodial parent who has assigned her rights to
support to request notification of proceedings and other
pertinent information.1
47
Overall, federal law requires that custodial parents
receive some type of notice of IV-D proceedings.
48
However, there is no assurance under federal law or
many state statutes that custodial parents will receive
reliable notice of all informal meetings, formal
conferences, and hearings in IV-D cases.
B. Right to Participate in and Make Decisions
Concerning Administrative Proceedings and
Judicial Hearings
The degree to which custodial parents can participate in
and influence the direction or outcome of a child support
action brought by a IV-D agency differs among states.
149
Whether a custodial parent has a role in decision-making
or a right to appeal often depends upon her status as a
public assistance or non-public assistance recipient.
In some states, custodial parents are permitted to
participate in the administrative or judicial adjudication
of IV-D cases. In Oregon, for example, state law permits
both the non-custodial parent and the custodial parent to
request a negotiation conference to discuss the amount of
support or health care coverage to be paid. 5 ' If the
parties do not reach an agreement, then the agency sends
a new notice and finding of financial responsibility to
both parents and informs them of their rights to submit a
written objection and request an administrative
hearing.' 51 The state agency allows both parents to
participate in the administrative hearing.
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Other states, in contrast, limit the ability of
custodial parents to initiate or participate in proceedings.
In Florida, for example, the state IV-D agency can issue
a proposed administrative support order on behalf of a
public assistance recipient or a non-public assistance
recipient who has requested IV-D services. 153 Once the
IV-D agency has issued a proposed order, only the non-
custodial parent has the right to request an administrative
hearing. 54 The statute does not authorize the custodial
parent to request an administrative hearing nor does it
indicate whether the custodial parent has a right to
participate in a hearing requested by the non-custodial
parent. I1 5 In Washington, D.C., the custodial parent may
not participate in a judicial proceeding unless the agency
calls her as a witness or she has been authorized by a
judge to formally intervene in the case.'
56
Many states expressly mandate that the IV-D
agency has the sole discretion to make decisions in a IV-
D case. In Florida, for example, state law authorizes the
IV-D agency to "settle and compromise actions brought
pursuant to law.' ' 157 In Colorado, the applicant is
informed that the IV-D agency has the "sole discretion"
to decide what legal remedies should be used in agency
child support cases.'5 8 In some states, the degree of
decision-making authority of the parent varies depending
upon whether the parent is a recipient of public
assistance.159 In California, "the local child support
agency shall control support and parentage litigation...
and the manner, method, and procedures used in
establishing parentage and in establishing and enforcing
support obligations" until the IV-D case is closed. '60
However, in cases involving non-public assistance reci-
pients of IV-D services, once the custodial
parent/caretaker becomes a party to the support action,
California law prohibits the district attorney or Attorney
General from submitting a stipulation establishing or
modifying a support order for court approval until the
attorney has obtained the consent and signature of the
recipient. 61
Other state courts have held that the IV-D agency
can take action that conflicts with the desires of the
custodial parents in non-public assistance cases. A Texas
Court of Appeals case found that the state had standing
to appeal a lower court decision that neither the custodial
parent nor the non-custodial parent wanted to appeal.
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Although the custodial parent was not a public assistance
recipient, the court found that the custodial parent had
assigned the right to establish and enforce support to the
Attorney General, and therefore, the state had standing to
appeal the lower court decision.163 The court reasoned
that the Attorney General "has a broader interest in the
uniform enforcement of child support than the individual
parties who are joined in [the] controversy. That interest
is independent of whatever monetary interest the State
may have invested, if any, in seeking to ensure the best
interest of the children in question."' 64
The extent to which custodial parents have an
independent right to appeal administrative or judicial
decisions in IV-D cases varies among states. In Oregon,
for example, custodial parents, as parties, may appeal
orders of administrative law judges issued in IV-D cases
as well as default orders and consent orders entered by
the administrator of the IV-D agency. 65 In other states,
rights of appeal are limited to non-custodial parents. In
Florida, for example, only the non-custodial parent has
the right to seek judicial review of an administrative
support order issued by the agency. 166 Both the non-
custodial parent and the IV-D agency have the right to
seek judicial review of administrative decisions made by
Vol. 26 * No. 4 . Winter 2006
Stacy Brustin
an administrative law judge. 167 Some states leave the
authority to appeal IV-D cases in the hands of the IV-D
agency and its attorneys.168
3. Agency Explanations of the Rights and
Obligations of Custodial Parents in IV-D
Cases
In order to adequately protect their interests, custodial
parents must understand their relationship with the IV-D
agency, including limits on confidentiality and conflicts
of interest that can arise. The custodial parent must also
understand her rights and responsibilities in IV-D cases.
A custodial parent who does not understand the role of
the IV-D agency and its attorneys may believe that the
state will protect her interests. If the custodial parent
does not realize that she has rights to intervene in
proceedings or appeal decisions, then she may not take
steps to protect interests that diverge from the state's
interests. Some states require IV-D agencies to provide
these cautionary explanations. For example, Tennessee
law requires that government attorneys affirmatively
notify all TANF and non-TANF recipients of IV-D
services that "no incidents of the lawyer-client
relationship, including the confidentiality of lawyer-
client communications, exist between the attorney and
the applicant or recipient.',
169
In many states, the explanations provided to
custodial parents concerning the role of the IV-D agency
are not very detailed. 170 Applications for IV-D services
often include a cursory, one or two-line statement that
the child support agency represents the state's interest
and that no attorney-client relationship exists between
the agency and the parent. The IV-D agency materials
neither define these terms nor explain the implications of
representation policies. For example, in Wisconsin, the
Parent Application for Child Support Services has a one-
sentence disclaimer at the end of the application stating
that "the child support attorney does not represent either
parent, but rather represents the state's interest in
enforcing support.' 7'1 There is no explanation as to the
meaning of the disclaimer.172
The IV-D agency applications for services often do
not clearly explain the limits of confidentiality to
custodial parents. 73 One of the most troubling explana-
tions concerning confidentiality can be found in the
Florida application. In Florida, applicants must sign and
affirm that they understand that the only attorney-client
relationship that exists is between the department and its
contracted attorney. 74 However, in the next line of the
application, the applicant is told that "all information
provided to the department and/or its contracted attorney
pursuant to this case shall remain confidential and
protected as if an attorney/client relationship existed
between the contracted attorney and [the applicant].' 75
This explanation of the relationship between attorney
and applicant is confusing and suggests that the lawyer
for the government is acting as though he or she is the
attorney for the applicant. This is particularly
troublesome given the fact that, by statute, the
government attorneys are authorized to reveal damaging
information about applicants."'
A few states provide a more comprehensive
explanation concerning conflicts of interest, confiden-
tiality, and the rights of custodial parents in IV-D
proceedings. 177 Wyoming, for example, informs parents
that state child support attorneys do not represent
parents, and explains that conflicts of interest may exist
or develop between the state and the parent. 7 The
applicant is required to review and sign an Acknow-
ledgment of Limitation of Representation, which gives
examples of the types of conflicts that could arise
including: payments received by the state may be split
between two custodial parents; the state may retain a
portion of the amount collected to reimburse the state for
public assistance paid; the state may seek a reduction in
child support if the non-custodial parent's income
decreases; and the state may seek child support from the
custodial parent if custody should transfer to the non-
custodial parent at some point in the future. 179 The IV-D
agency also explains that the state's attorney does not
owe the parent any duty of confidentiality, giving
examples of situations in which a lawyer for the agency
might use information that the custodial parent provides
to take actions against the custodial parent.180 Oregon
explains the rights of parents to participate in IV-D
proceedings. In an attachment to the application for
services, the agency explains that "[b]oth parents have
equal status in child support cases. Either parent can ask
questions, raise issues or request changes, with or
without assistance from a lawyer."' 81
Regardless of the comprehensiveness of IV-D
agency explanations, the language used to explain
representation policies and their implications is
uniformly complex and loaded with legal jargon. The
application or agreement for services may refer to
"conflicts of interest," but it rarely defines the term.' 82
Furthermore, in states that do not automatically consider
the custodial parent a party to an administrative or
judicial action, the applications or assignments rarely
explain the process for intervening in a case nor do they
outline the benefits of seeking private counsel. As a
result, many custodians remain unclear about the role of
the IV-D agency and its attorneys.1 83 They believe,
particularly those non-public assistance custodians who
have affirmatively sought IV-D services, that the state
will protect their interests because the state shares their
goal of collecting support from the non-custodial
parent. 1 84 If custodial parents do not understand IV-D
representation policies, potential conflicts of interest,
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limitations on confidentiality, and their rights to
intervene or participate in proceedings, then custodial
parents cannot adequately protect their own interests and
the interests of their children.
V. Custodial Parents Are Real
Parties in Interest Who Are
Indispensable to IV-D Actions
The custodial parent should be considered a party rather
than a witness in a IV-D case. State courts have held that
the paramount consideration in child support matters
must be the best interest of the child.18 5 Since it is the
custodian of the child rather than the state who is legally
charged with making decisions on behalf of the child, a
court or an administrative law judge cannot adequately
consider what is in the best interest of the child without
the involvement of the custodian, regardless of whether
the custodial parent has assigned some of her rights to
collect support. The child does not have capacity to bring
suit or protect interests that diverge from the interest of
the state. The custodial parent maintains this authority
and legislatures or courts should deem custodial parents
parties to IV-D judicial and administrative proceedings
so that they may assert this authority.
1. Custodial Parents Are Real Parties in
Interest Who Have Capacity and Standing
to Sue
In order to determine whether an individual is a proper
party in a civil suit, courts consider three factors:
(1) whether the individual is a "real party in interest"
because she has an interest to assert or protect; 1
6
(2) whether the individual has legal "capacity" to sue or
be sued; and (3) whether the individual has "standing" to
sue. 1 7 Custodial parents are real parties in interest in IV-
D patemity/child support actions because they have
constitutional liberty interests, statutory rights, and
pecuniary interests to assert. 18 Child support agencies
do not necessarily share these interests, nor are they
obligated to protect them.'8 9 Failure to consider the
custodial parent a party deprives the parent of the right to
have input into childrearing decisions such as estab-
lishing paternity, determining appropriate health
insurance coverage, and maintaining or protecting
familial relationships. The custodial parent also has
distinct and significant financial interests to protect in a
IV-D case including securing: support orders that truly
reflect the ability of both parents to contribute, pass
through payments, support arrearage, and retroactive
support.190
Even in cases involving assignments, the custodial
parent is a real party in interest because the assignment
of rights to collect support is only a partial assignment.
Under general principles of contract law, an individual
can execute two different types of assignments: a full
assignment or a partial assignment.19' In a full assign-
ment, a person assigns to a third party all of his rights in
a piece of property or his rights to collect on a debt.
192
Generally, the assignee does not need to join the assignor
in litigation involving the property or debt assigned
because complete relief can be granted in the assignor's
absence. 93 The assignor has no interest to protect and
therefore is not a real party in interest.1 94 In a partial
assignment, a person assigns certain interests in property
or rights to collect debts but retains some interest in the
property or rights transferred. 195 An individual who has
partially assigned his or her rights may retain a sufficient
interest or substantive right so as to qualify as a real
party in interest in any litigation concerning the
property.'
96
Statutes, regulations, and caselaw discussing
assignments of child support rights in IV-D cases do not
expressly address whether these assignments are full or
partial assignments. 197 However, given the weighty
interests that custodial parents retain in IV-D cases, any
assignment executed should properly be considered a
partial assignment. In public assistance cases, the
custodial parent retains liberty and custodial interests as
well as pecuniary interests in the IV-D case. 198 The state
can only retain the amount of child support needed to
reimburse public assistance funds paid to the family.' 99
Any money in excess of this amount must be distributed
200to the custodial parent. In addition, public assistance
recipients are entitled to receive monetary pass through
payments from monies collected by the state.20' These
parents also have a future interest in collecting adequate
child support. At any point, the custodial parent can
choose to leave the TANF program or may be forced to
leave pursuant to federal and state time limit
202requirements. As soon as a custodial parent leaves the
TANF program (whether voluntarily or as a result of
time limits), she is entitled to receive child support
payments collected in the month following her exit from
203the program. As a result, public assistance recipients
retain significant financial interests in IV-D cases.
In cases involving custodial parents who have
assigned their rights to collect support but are not
receiving public assistance, parents retain an even
stronger pecuniary interest in the case because they are
entitled to receive all monies collected.2 °4 Several federal
bankruptcy courts have gone so far as to hold that non-
public assistance assignments are not true assignments.
In Washington State, for example, a bankruptcy court
found that non-public assistance assignments are "not
true assignments but rather were merely procedures for
the orderly and efficient collection of child support on
behalf of the custodial parent ... [and] the State's non-
assistance collection program here, merely facilitates the
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custodial parent's enforcement of child support rights
without transferring their beneficial right to receive child
support., 20 5 The court cited several similar decisions in
Ohio and Indiana.2°6 These cases lend support to the
argument that the custodial parent retains a valid, legally
cognizable claim or right in the action, is executing a
partial assignment, and is a real party in interest.
207
Custodial parents have capacity to sue to establish
paternity and child support on behalf of their minor
children. State statutes and common law recognize the
right, if not the obligation, of parents to act in a
representative capacity on behalf of their children. Upon
the birth of a child, both parents are considered the legal
208guardian or custodian of the child. The parents have
the right to make major decisions concerning the
upbringing of the child such as where the child will
reside, what type of education and healthcare the child
will receive, and to which religious faith the child will
belong.209 As long as a child is a minor, he or she is not
competent to bring suit in a court of law.210 Instead, the
parents of the child are authorized, as the natural and
legal guardians, to bring suit or initiate action on behalf
of the child. It is the parent who has the decision-making
power in any ensuing litigation and it is the parent's
obligation to ensure that the minor's interests in the suit
211are protected.
If the parents do not reside together, both parents
retain the right to make decisions for the child and bring
suit on behalf of the child.2 12 If disagreements arise or
the parties wish to formalize decision-making authority,
either parent is eligible to petition a court and request
that the court determine whether one parent should retain
sole authority to make major decisions or whether both
parties should share custody and retain some degree of
authority for making major child rearing decisions.
213
The legal custodian of the children has the authority to
bring an action for child support on behalf of the child,
though in some states this right may be limited if the
214custodial parent is receiving public assistance. While
the child support proceeding may nominally be brought
in the name of the parent, the custodial parent acts in a
representative capacity to enforce the child's right to
support.
215
The state and courts can only limit or supersede
these custodial rights in order to protect the health and
welfare of the child. The United States Supreme Court
has made it clear that the state and the parent do not have
216equal rights to a child. Instead, in order to intervene in
the relationship between the child and the parent, the
state must make a showing of unfitness in order to
217ensure that the parents are afforded due process. In
cases in which a parent is deceased or unable to care for
a child, a relative or other responsible adult may step in
as caretaker of the child. Once vested with legal custody
or guardianship of the child, this caretaker has the
authority to initiate, modify, or enforce child support
actions on behalf of the minor child.21 8
In addition to having capacity to sue, custodial
parents have standing to sue and participate in the
adjudication of IV-D cases. The Supreme Court has
explained that "in essence the question of standing is
whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide
the merits of the dispute or of particular issues., 219 The
issue of standing typically arises when a plaintiff
attempts to challenge a statute or a decision issued by a
government agency. 22° The issue of standing arises in
both federal and state courts. Whether an individual has
standing to sue is generally determined by statute or by
courts on an individual case basis.
22 1
State statutes typically confer standing on parents,
legal guardians/caretakers, and government IV-D
222agencies to initiate child support actions. These
statutes do not expressly address the standing of parents
223in support cases initiated by the government.
Nevertheless, in these cases the custodial parent retains
significant liberty and financial interests in the outcome
of the action. Any decision issued in such a case directly
impacts the custodial parent's individual interests and the
interests of the child whom the custodial parent is
charged with representing. A custodial parent has
constitutionally protected rights to rear his or her child
and may be entitled to receive retroactive support,
prospective support, medical support, pass through
support, and arrearage on behalf of the child. The parent
is closely connected to and affected by the controversy
concerning whether and how a child support order
should be established, enforced, or modified. This
connection remains even if the parent has executed a
partial assignment. Therefore, custodial parents meet the
requirements for standing.
So long as she remains the legal custodian of the
child[ren] at issue, the custodial parent is a real party in
interest who has capacity and standing to sue. Her status
as a proper party is not compromised by the fact that she
may have executed an assignment of certain rights to
collect support because such assignment is limited.224
2. Custodial Parents Are Necessary Parties
to IV-D Case
Determining that the custodial parent is a real party in
interest does not resolve the issue of whether the
custodial parent must be joined as a necessary or
indispensable party to the IV-D action. 225 Courts have
held, for example, that the child who is owed support is a
real party in interest but he or she does not need to be
226joined in the action. In order to be considered a
necessary party, a person must not only have interests in
common with existing parties in the lawsuit, but she
must have interests so strong that failure to join the
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individual would threaten the person's own rights or the
rights of others.227 Custodial parents meet the standard
for necessary party status because failure to join the
parent to a IV-D action threatens the parent's liberty and
pecuniary interests, threatens her rights to due process,
and deprives the child of the right to have a parent or
caretaker act in a representational capacity on his or her
behalf.
The standard for determining whether someone should
be joined as a necessary or indispensable party is found in
228Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Many
states have adopted a compulsory joinder rule akin to the
229federal rule. According to Rule 19:
[A person] shall be joined as a party in the action
if (1) in the person's absence complete relief
cannot be accorded among those already parties,
or (2) the person claims an interest relating to the
subject of the action and is so situated that the
disposition of the action in the person's absence
may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede the
person's ability to protect that interest or
(ii) leave any of the persons already parties
subject to a substantial risk of incurring double,
multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by
reason of the claimed interest.
230
A court, in deciding a compulsory joinder issue,
must evaluate the degree to which a nonparty has an
interest in the ongoing litigation and the harm that might
occur if the individual is not joined.2 3 1 The general
policy behind the concept ofjoinder is that courts should
issue full and complete remedies to all relevant parties
while avoiding duplicative litigation and the imposition
of multiple liability or inconsistent obligations on
defendants.232 In addition, courts seek to protect
individuals who may be bound by a decision issued in
their absence. 233 If an individual has executed a partial
assignment, the court must determine whether the
assignor's interest in the matter is significant enough to
require that the individual be joined in the action.23
A. Disposition of the IV-D Action in the
Custodial Parent's Absence Infringes on the
Parent's Constitutional,. Statutory, and
Common Law Rights to Care for and Act in a
Representational Capacity on Behalf of Minor
Children
The failure to join a custodial parent as a party to a IV-D
case constitutes a violation of due process. As the
Supreme Court stated in Provident Tradesmen Bank &
Trust Co. v. Patterson, "[n]either Rule 19, nor we, today,
mean to foreclose an examination in future cases to see
whether an injustice is being, or might be, done to the
substantive, or, for that matter, constitutional, rights of
an outsider by proceeding with a particular case.
'235
Failure to join custodial parents infringes upon their
fundamental liberty interests in the custody and rearing
of their children. 236 Custodial parents should be
permitted to assert their views on critical issues that arise
in IV-D cases such as paternity, health insurance
coverage, and familial relationships-issues that affect
the safety and well-being of their children. In addition, if
the custodial parent is not joined to a IV-D action, she
may be deprived of property interests such as retroactive
support, child support arrearage, and pass through
support without due process of law.
Parties to civil judicial proceedings enjoy many
procedural protections. They typically have a right to
timely notice of issues and an opportunity to review
evidence, present argument, and cross-examine adverse
witnesses.237 Administrative agency adjudications do not
require the same level of procedural protection as civil
judicial trials, though the federal Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) and its state counterparts require
certain procedural protections. 238 Agencies often adopt
procedures designed to safeguard parties in administra-
tive adjudications including provision of notice,
opportunity to present arguments and evidence in writing
or orally, and issuance of a decision by a neutral fact-
finder that explains the rationale of a decision.
239
Failure to afford these types of procedural protec-
tions to individuals whose interests are at stake in
litigation can constitute a violation of due process. In
Mathews v. Eldridge,4 ° the Supreme Court set forth
three factors to be considered in determining whether a
violation of procedural due process has occurred. A court
must consider:
First, the private interest that will be affected by
the official action; second, the risk of erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the proce-
dures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards;
and finally, the Government's interest, including
the function involved and the fiscal and admini-
strative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirements would entail.
24 1
When one applies the Mathews factors to the
situation of custodial parents who are relegated to non-
party status in IV-D cases, it becomes evident that child
support agencies, courts, or administrative authorities
that fail to join custodial parents to IV-D actions deprive
them of due process.
First, the private interests of parents affected by the
official action of the agency or adjudicating body are
significant. As discussed above, failure to join the
custodial parent to a IV-D action jeopardizes both liberty
and pecuniary interests of the parent and child. If a
parent is not a party to the action, she will not receive the
procedural protections that enable her to safeguard these
interests. While some of the parent's interests may
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coincide with the interests of the state, many will not. As
a bystander or as a witness, the custodial parent cannot
protect these distinct interests.
242
Secondly, there is a substantial risk that if the
custodial parent is not joined as a party and afforded
procedural protections in IV-D cases, her interests and
the interests of the child whom she is charged with
protecting will be negatively affected. Issues concerning
health insurance, adequacy of child support, or
retroactive support arise in nearly every IV-D case.
24 3
Additional concerns such as domestic violence or the
relationship between the child and the non-custodial
parent are present in many cases. 244 The state and the
non-custodial parent have the opportunity to address
these issues in both informal and formal proceedings.
However, the custodial parent's opportunity to do so is
often limited either by law or practice. 245 The IV-D
agency and its attorneys do not represent the custodial
parent.246 Given that many of the state's interests as well
as those of the non-custodial parent conflict with those of
the custodial parent and the child whom she is obligated
to protect, there is a significant risk that without an
opportunity to participate as a party in administrative and
judicial adjudications of IV-D cases, the interests of the
custodial parent and the child will not be asserted. If
these issues are not asserted, then courts, administrative
tribunals, or child support agencies will issue orders that
compromise the physical and economic well-being of
children.
The value of existing procedural safeguards, such
as notices sent to the custodial parent by the IV-D
agency or the right to seek intervention, are insufficient
to protect the interests of the parent and the child.
Federal law requires IV-D agencies to send notice of
proceedings in which support obligations may be
247established or modified 7. However, it does not require
the agency to inform the custodial parent of informal
conferences or meetings in which support is often
calculated nor does it mandate that custodial parents
have an opportunity to participate in informal and formal
proceedings. In terms of intervention, many parents must
use IV-D services as a condition of receiving public
assistance or because they do not have the resources to
hire a private attorney.248 There are few, if any, attorneys
available to provide free or low-cost legal services in
child support matters. Without the assistance of an
attorney, most parents/caretakers will not realize that
they can request to intervene in a judicial or
administrative proceeding.249
Furthermore, parents are unlikely to understand that
they may be prohibited from relitigating claims at a later
date or prevented from retroactively modifying support
orders that were decided based on insufficient or
inaccurate evidence. 25 Parents are also unlikely to be
aware that government attorneys and IV-D staff may be
immune from civil liability for mistakes they make in
251handling a IV-D case. In Gill v. Ripley, for example,
the Maryland Court of Appeals found that the state's
attorneys and their support staff had absolute immunity
from civil liability for having dismissed a paternity
action with prejudice. The custodial parent had
consented to dismissal of the case but not with
prejudice.252 The court found that "prosecutors enjoy
absolute immunity with respect to claims arising from
their role in the judicial process" and held that such
immunity applied in a civil paternity proceeding.253 The
immunity enjoyed by the government attorneys also
extended to a non-lawyer, IV-D employee who was
acting under the direction of the state's attorney and
undertook tasks that were directly involved with the
prosecution or non-prosecution of the paternity case.254
The court noted that its determination was in line with
decisions in other states, citing paternity cases in Iowa,
Michigan, Minnesota, California, and Indiana.255 In light
of the immunity afforded to IV-D agency staff, it is
critical that custodial parents have the opportunity to
participate in IV-D proceedings.
The burden imposed on the state by requiring that
(i) the custodial parent be deemed a party and (ii) the IV-
D agency fully inform the custodial parent of the
representation policy and its implications is minimal
when compared with the interests at stake. States are
already required to notify parents of proceedings
involving establishment or modification of child
support. 256 It should not add excessive expense to
include in this notice, dates of informal conferences to be
held prior to hearing. Notice of proceedings could be
effectuated by first class mail rather than by more costly
means such as certified mail or personal service. 257 In
addition, most states already notify custodial parents,
generally in the application for services, of the state's
representation policy. 258 Therefore, it should not add
significant cost to identify potential conflicts between the
state and the custodial parent and explain the custodial
parent's rights in the IV-D child support process.
259
The Supreme Court of California rejected this type
of due process argument in Monterey County v.
Cornejo.260 The trial court had allocated a tax
dependency deduction to a non-custodial parent in a
support enforcement proceeding brought by the District
261Attorney. The custodial parent was not a party to the
case. 262 On appeal, the County argued that it was a
violation of due process to litigate the custodial parent's
right to tax benefits in a proceeding to which the parent
was not a party. 263 The California Supreme Court found
that the County, represented by the District Attorney,
brought the action on behalf of the custodial parent and
was authorized to enforce issues relevant to paternity and
child support. 264 The court noted that while the custodial
parent was not a party, the mother cooperated with the
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District Attorney, provided financial documentation, and
was available to testify.265 Further, the court pointed out
that the District Attorney submitted written points and
authorities in opposition addressing the exemption issue,
the District Attorney argued to the lower court that the
mother was opposed to the exemption request, and the
lower court considered the income and expenses of both
266parents in deciding the issue. The court gave
significant weight to the fact that, pursuant to California
statute, the custodial parent could relitigate the issue in a
subsequent action.267 In its rejection of the due process
argument, the court noted that at any point, the District
Attorney or the parent could have requested that the
custodial parent be made a party to the action.
268
The dissent in Monterey argued that the custodial
parent's due process rights were violated when she failed
to receive notice and an opportunity to be heard on the
exemption allocation issue. 269 Applying the Mathews v.
Eldridge factors, the dissent concluded that there was a
significant private interest at stake: the tax dependency
exemption, which provides financial benefit to the parent
who claims it.27° Second, the risk of "erroneous
deprivation" was significant because the custodial parent
was not represented by the state and the District Attorney
did not present arguments on behalf of the parent
concerning allocation of the exemption. 271 According to
the dissent, "the custodial parent in fact had no
opportunity to be heard or to be represented by counsel
on this significant property issue." 272 The dissenting
justice argued that it would not have been unduly
burdensome to provide the custodial parent with notice
and an opportunity to be heard and such opportunity
would have helped promote the interest of the state in
securing adequate support of children following
divorce.273 The dissent rejected the majority view that
the custodial parent was also protected because she could
relitigate the issue in the future, suggesting that she may
not have the means to do so.
274
The Monterey decision relied heavily on a
California statute that permits a custodial parent to
relitigate issues that were previously litigated by the state
in a IV-D action. 275 However, custodial parents in many
states do not enjoy the right to relitigate and, as the
dissent in Monterey noted, even those who do may not
have the means to exercise the right.276 In addition, in
Monterey there was no clear conflict between the state's
position and the position of the custodial parent. The
Monterey court did not address the situation that fre-
quently arises in IV-D cases in which the interests of the
state and the interests of the parent concerning health
care, retroactive support, or a host of other issues con-
flict. 277 In those situations, the custodial parent cannot
rely on the attorneys for the IV-D agency to represent or
assert her interests. A custodial parent who does not
receive notice (including a comprehensive explanation of
the representation policy and its implications), an
opportunity to participate, or an opportunity to seek
review of an adverse decision in an administrative or
judicial proceeding, stands to lose significant rights to
property as well as rights to rear and protect the best
interest of her children. The economic losses are
particularly significant given the low-income status of
most custodial parents utilizing IV-D agency services.
Failure to join custodial parents in IV-D actions
also impedes the parents' ability to exercise their
statutory/common law rights to custody. As discussed
earlier, 278 parents have the statutory and/or common law
right to make major decisions concerning the upbringing,
safety, and welfare of that child. As legal custodians,
parents have the authority to act in a representative
capacity on behalf of their children in lawsuits or
administrative proceedings. Parents cannot effectively
protect the interests of their children if they do not
understand the role of the state agency and do not have
notice of or an opportunity to participate in judicial or
administrative proceedings involving IV-D cases.
B. Failure to Join Custodial Parents Impairs
Their Ability to Protect Their Interests
Because They May Be Bound by Judgments
Issued in IV-D Cases
There is a significant risk that a custodial parent who is
not joined in a IV-D action will be barred by collateral
estoppel or res judicata from relitigating issues addressed
279in the IV-D action. If the custodial parent is a real
party in interest who could have intervened in the earlier
proceeding, 28 who may be considered to be in privity
with the parties to the original proceeding and thus,
barred by collateral estoppel or res judicata from
28128relitigating issues. In Turner v. Butler,282 for example,
the Court of Appeals of Georgia held that a mother was
precluded from bringing an action against the father for
fraudulent misrepresentation of income in a previous
child support hearing. 283 The state IV-D agency had
brought the initial child support action and the mother
284argued that she was not in privity with the agency. The
court found that the purpose of the mother's current
action and the agency's previous action was the same-
to collect child support.285 According to the court, "the
gravamen of this action is that [the father] mis-
represented his income to the DHR in the earlier
proceeding. If [the mother] was not a privy of the DHR
in that proceeding, then she was a stranger to it and lacks
standing to bring this suit." 286 The court held that the
judgment entered in the original child support action was
res judicata and binding unless set aside or reversed.287
Similarly, in Lohman v. Flynn, the Idaho Supreme
Court determined that a custodial parent was in privity
with the state and was barred by res judicata from
bringing an action seeking retroactive child support. 288 In
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that case, the mother of the child had brought suit against
the father, seeking reimbursement of expenses incurred
prior to the establishment of a paternity and support
order.28 9 The father argued that the mother's claim was
barred by res judicata because the state IV-D agency had
previously litigated a case, at the request of the mother,
in which paternity was established, a child support order
was issued, and the father was ordered to pay support
retroactive to the date the paternity case was filed. 290 In
the previous action, the state did not request
reimbursement expenses incurred by the mother prior to
the filing of the paternity action.
291
The court noted that the mother had requested IV-D
services and, pursuant to Idaho law, she could have
requested that the agency seek reimbursement for
expenses incurred prior to the establishment of
paternity.292 The mother claimed that the IV-D agency
did not involve her in the case or inform her as to how
the case was progressing.293 She further argued that she
did not participate in the litigation. Nevertheless, the
Idaho Supreme Court determined that the mother had a
full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the earlier
case.295 The court found that the issue of child support
was adjudicated in the prior case, though reimbursement
was not addressed, and the court rendered a final
judgment on the merits.296 The court stated that the
critical question for its consideration was whether privity
existed between the mother and the state child support
297agency. The court explained that for privity to exist,
the plaintiff must have derived benefit or had a direct
interest in the outcome of the previous litigation.298 The
court found that Ms. Lohman had requested that the state
agency act on her behalf and the state had no
independent interest in pursuing the action because
Lohman was not receiving public assistance. 2 99 In
addition, "[a]lthough Lohman may not have been an
active participant in the prior litigation, all of the benefits
recovered were given to Lohman; the state had nothing
to recover. Lohman clearly derived a direct interest in
the outcome of the former litigation and, therefore, was
in privity with the state.,, 300 As a result, the court found
that the mother was barred from bringing the subsequent
action.30
Custodial parents are also at risk of being bound by
administrative decisions in IV-D cases issued in their
absence. The principles of res judicata and collateral
estoppel may apply to judgments rendered in
administrative proceedings so long as the issues or
claims raised were properly before the agency and
contested factual and legal issues were resolved after
adequate opportunity for litigation.30 2 "'The essential
elements of adjudication,' including 'fair opportunity to
rebut evidence and argument by opposing parties,"' must
303be present in the administrative proceeding. In other
words, when administrative agencies hold trial-like
hearings in which the agency or AU makes findings of
facts and applies the law to the facts, res judicata
ordinarily applies to the decision.30 The agency must
take action that resembles a court proceeding rather than
merely executing a ministerial duty.30 5 An administrative
determination issued after such a proceeding may bind
parties, and those in privity, to the underlying action.0
A legislature has the prerogative to enact a statute
that allows relitigation and prohibits the application of
307res judicata to administrative or judicial decisions.
Some states have permitted relitigation of support
308issues. California, for example, enacted a statute that
expressly authorizes a custodial or non-custodial parent
to relitigate child support issues previously raised in an
action brought by the IV-D agency.3°9 The statute
provides that in a subsequent proceeding, the court has
the authority to make an independent determination on
the issue of support that may supersede the support order
made in the original action. 310 However, as discussed in
the next section, even if the custodial parent is permitted
to relitigate issues at a later date, both the parent and the
child can still be harmed by judgments entered in
proceedings to which the custodial parent was not a
party.
C. Even if Relitigation Is Permitted, the
Custodial Parent Can Be Harmed by a
Judgment Issued in the Original Action
Regardless of whether a custodial parent is permitted to
relitigate paternity or child support claims, the second
prong of the compulsory joinder test is still met because
custodial parents who are not joined to the original
action can be significantly harmed by prohibitions
against retroactive modification. Federal law requires, as
a condition for granting IV-D funding, that states
prohibit retroactive modification of support orders.3i
These laws prevent a court or administrative tribunal
from adjusting the amount of support owed by the non-
custodial parent based on evidence that comes to light
after the initial order is entered.312 The fact-finder can
prospectively modify child support based on changed
circumstances but she cannot adjust amounts that have
been reduced to judgment.313 As a result, if a custodial
parent discovers that an inappropriate amount of child
support was established in a IV-D case, based on
inaccurate, insufficient, or fraudulent evidence, the
parent can attempt to relitigate the issue or file a motion
to modify the existing order but any modification
awarded applies only to prospective support. The child
cannot receive an adjusted amount of support to
compensate for the period of time in which the
inappropriate order was in effect.314 Therefore, it is
critical that the custodial parent be joined in the IV-D
action to ensure that issues concerning child support,
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medical support, and protection of children are
adjudicated fully and correctly the first time around.315
In addition, custodial parents who have the right to
relitigate paternity and child support issues may not be
aware of these rights or have the ability to enforce them.
As discussed above, many custodial parents do not
understand the role of the IV-D agency and its attorneys.
They may believe that the IV-D agency represents their
interests and therefore, whatever judgment the agency
secures is in their interest or is the best judgment they are
likely to get. Even if the custodial parent understands
that they have a right to relitigate, they may not have the
resources to do so. Low or moderate-income custodial
parents will have great difficulty finding free or reduced-
cost legal services. In addition, this litigation is time
consuming and custodial parents often cannot afford to
miss work or pay for childcare to attend an additional set
of court hearings or administrative proceedings.
Although a child may have a right to relitigate a
paternity or support issue, these actions are likely to be
initiated once a child reaches adolescence or adulthood,
long after the child has experienced the effects of an
inappropriate child support order.
VI. Recommendations for Change
In order to ensure that custodial parents are able to
exercise their liberty interests, protect their pecuniary
interests, and fulfill their obligation to act in a
representative capacity on behalf of their children, they
must be considered parties to IV-D actions. Congress
and state legislatures should follow the lead of states
such as Oregon and enact legislation formalizing party
status for custodial parents.316 In those states that do not
adopt such statutes or regulations, judges should take the
initiative to join custodial parents as necessary parties to
judicial and administrative proceedings pursuant to local
rules of civil procedure and administrative procedure.
Child support agencies, including attorneys working for
or contracted by the agency, must do more to inform
custodial parents about representation policies and their
implications. Local bar associations, law schools, and
legal services organizations can educate the public about
the parents' roles in a IV-D case and the problems that
can arise if the custodial parent fails to participate in or
monitor a IV-D case.
1. Legislative Change
Congress should remedy the ambiguity and incon-
sistency that exists throughout Section IV-D of the
Social Security Act and its implementing regulations
317concerning the party status of custodial parents. As a
condition of funding, the Social Security Act requires
states to enact a host of laws designed to enhance the
318effectiveness of the IV-D child support program.
Congress should add to this list a requirement that each
state enact laws and regulations making custodial parents
parties to IV-D paternity and support actions from the
outset of the case.3 19
In non-public assistance cases, the custodial parent
should be named as a plaintiff. In these cases, the parent
has sought the assistance of the IV-D agency and is
entitled to receive all prospective child support collected.
In public assistance cases, the custodial parent should not
be named as a plaintiff but should be deemed an
interested and necessary party to all IV-D cases. In these
public assistance cases, the custodial parent is not
affirmatively seeking IV-D services but is required to
assign her rights to support to the state. The state is
initiating the action in order to recoup public assistance
funds or to reduce dependency on public assistance.
Particularly in cases in which the custodial parent is not
entitled to receive any of the monies collected, she may
believe that having the government pursue child support
from the non-custodial parent is not in the best interests
of her child.320 However, the custodial parent is an
interested and necessary party to the IV-D case
regardless of whether she wants the government to
initiate the case. The custodial parent's interests and the
interests of her child are at stake and she must be
afforded an opportunity to protect those interests.
Therefore, in IV-D public assistance cases, the custodial
parent should not be named as the plaintiff but should be
joined as an interested party.
The IV-D statute and its implementing regulations
should also require states to afford custodial parents the
same due process rights as other parties including the
right to notice of all judicial and administrative
conferences and proceedings, the opportunity to
participate in such conferences and proceedings, and the
right to seek review of judicial or administrative
determinations. In addition, state IV-D agencies should
be required to provide comprehensive explanations of
the agency's representation policy to the custodial parent
at the outset of a case as well as at intermittent points
during the processing of the case. These explanations
should include examples of potential conflicts of interest
as well as examples of information that agency personnel
may disclose to third parties.
States should also enact legislation mandating that
custodial parents be considered parties in all IV-D cases.
Again, custodial parents who receive public assistance
and are required to assign their rights to support should
not be named as plaintiffs in IV-D actions. State laws
and regulations should further require that in judicial
proceedings, custodians be given notice of all pro-
ceedings including negotiations and settlement
conferences,321 the opportunity to object to settlements
reached between the IV-D agency and the non-custodial
parent, the opportunity to participate in the proceeding
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regardless of whether the state chooses to call the
custodian as a witness, and the right to appeal lower
court decisions. State administrative codes should be
revised to clarify that custodial parents are parties to
administrative actions and to afford custodial parents the
same procedural due process protections given to non-
custodial parents. These due process protections should
include notice of all administrative conferences and
hearings, an opportunity to participate, and the right to
seek judicial review of administrative decisions.
State legislatures should enact laws requiring IV-D
agencies to provide comprehensive, clear explanations of
agency representation policies at the outset of a case as
well as at various points during the pendency of a IV-D
action. States can look to Oregon and Wyoming for
examples of model statutes. Oregon addresses the due
process rights of custodial parents in judicial and
administrative proceedings,322 while Wyoming fully
informs parents of the IV-D representation policy and
the conflicts of interest that can arise between the
custodial parents and the state.323 Legislation that
accords party status to custodial parents and requires that
states adequately inform parents of their rights not only
preserves the interests of parents, but helps ensure that
children, primarily children living at or near the poverty
line, receive appropriate financial and medical support.
2. Judicial Action
In those states that do not statutorily confer party status
on custodial parents, judges should routinely join
custodial parents to IV-D actions pursuant to compulsory
or permissive joinder rules. If the state or the defendant
does not move to join the interested person, a trial court
or an appellate court can, sua sponte, join the person as a
necessary party. 2
If a judge does not wish to take such action sua
sponte, then she should at least inform the custodial
parent of her right to seek to intervene in a IV-D action.
The court should ensure that the custodial parent
understands why it might be in her interest to intervene
325in the action. Judges should liberally grant inter-
vention when requested by the custodial parent and
courts should establish simple procedures for facilitating
intervention given that most custodial parents are not
represented by counsel. For example, court rules and
administrative regulations could allow for oral motions
to intervene rather than requiring written motions. Courts
and administrative agencies could develop user-friendly,
form motions that custodial parents could file prior to, or
on the day of, an administrative or judicial proceeding.
The automated system used by the court and IV-D
agency should indicate that custodial parents have
intervened so that notices and copies of orders are sent to
those parents.
3. Internal Child Support Agency Policies
and Procedures
In states in which there is no statute deeming a custodial
parent a party to a IV-D case, IV-D agencies should take
the initiative and move to join the custodial parent as a
party through motions for permissive or compulsory
joinder. Agencies should also develop administrative
procedures requiring that the custodial parent be given
notice and an opportunity to participate in all
administrative proceedings. Such policies, even if not
statutorily mandated, ensure that the rights of custodial
parents to protect the interests of their children are not
infringed. In addition, increased participation of
custodial parents-particularly those who do not receive
public assistance and have the strongest pecuniary
interest-can assist the agency in establishing and
enforcing support orders.
State IV-D programs should adopt internal policies
and procedures that require agency personnel to provide
clear, comprehensive explanations of the relationship
between the IV-D agency and custodial parents.
Information contained in customer agreement documents
must be written using simple, clear language. Materials
should explain the limits of confidentiality and potential
conflicts of interest using examples to illustrate the
points. IV-D staff should also provide oral explanations
to ensure that customers with limited literacy abilities
understand representation policies and their implications.
IV-D agencies should follow the lead of states such
as Wyoming, which inform parents that state child
support attorneys do not represent parents and explain
that conflicts of interest may exist or develop between
326the state and the parent. In Wyoming, the applicant is
required to review and sign an Acknowledgment of
Limitation of Representation, which gives examples of
327the types of conflicts which could arise. In addition,
the Wyoming IV-D agency explains to parents that the
State's Attorney does not owe the parent any duty of
confidentiality. 32  The documents give examples of
situations in which a lawyer for the agency might use
information that the custodial parent provides to take
actions against the custodial parent.329
In order to ensure that custodial parents understand
the role of. the state in child support proceedings,
government attorneys should explain that the agency can
take actions that directly contradict the desires of the
custodial parent. The agency must notify parents,
particularly once a conflict arises, that the parents have a
right to intervene and to seek private counsel. It is not
sufficient to merely notify custodial parents at the outset
of a case that a conflict of interest may arise in the
future. The IV-D agency should notify custodial parents,
in writing, at the outset, and attorneys or paralegals for
the agency should provide written and/or verbal
notification prior to informal conferences/negotiations
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and administrative and judicial proceedings. The
custodial parent who does not receive public assistance
must be informed that he or she can discontinue
receiving IV-D services at any point.
The OCSE has given attorneys working for or
contracted by IV-D agencies guidance on how to explain
the role of the government attorney to recipients of IV-D
services. In its manual for agency attorneys, the OCSE
recommends that the IV-D attorney disclose his or her
role and immediately clarify any misunderstandings that
a parent might have about this role.330 The manual also
cautions agency attorneys not to "bind the custodial
parent in settlement negotiations without the custodial
parent's consent and approval.",33' Further, it suggests
that attorneys advise custodial and non-custodial parents
to seek counsel if an apparent conflict arises.
3 32
The OCSE manual notes that a failure to clarify the
attorney's role may create an attorney-client relationship
in fact, even if a statute or regulation states that no such
relationship exists. 333 The Florida application for
services illustrates the type of ambiguous language that
could lead to problems. The applicant is told that "all
information provided to the department and/or its
contracted attorney pursuant to this case shall remain
confidential and protected as if an attorney/client
relationship existed between the contracted attorney and
[the applicant]. 334 This explanation of the relationship
between attorney and applicant suggests that, in terms of
client confidentiality, the lawyer for the government is
acting as though he or she is the attorney for the
applicant. The language could lead a custodial parent to
believe that an attorney-client relationship exists and,
therefore, such a relationship may in fact exist under the
rules of professional responsibility governing
attorneys.335
4. Bar Associations, Legal Services
Organizations, and Law Schools
Bar associations, legal services organizations, and law
schools (through clinical programs) can serve a critical
role in educating parents about their rights in IV-D child
support actions. These groups can generate written
materials, brochures, and Internet resources discussing
the party status of custodial parents, explaining the
representation policy of the local IV-D agency, and
underscoring the importance of intervening in an action
if the custodial parent is not deemed a party at the outset.
In addition, informational resources could inform
custodial parents about the potential risks of non-
participation including preclusion from relitigating
claims in the future, bans on retroactive modification of
support orders, and immunity of IV-D personnel from
liability. These organizations can also assist the court
and administrative agencies in drafting pro se pleadings
that custodial parents can use in IV-D cases, including
form motions to intervene in an action.
State bar associations, perhaps in coordination with
law school clinics or other non-profit legal services
providers, should also consider creating limited advice
services for custodial and non-custodial parents involved
in child support matters so that parents can receive
guidance about their rights and responsibilities in
administrative and judicial proceedings.
VII. Conclusion
Custodial parents are necessary parties to IV-D cases.
The failure of state child support agencies, courts, and
administrative tribunals to treat them as parties deprives
parents of the right to protect the best interests of their
children. Although many recipients of IV-D services
assign their rights to collect support to the state, these
assignments are limited. Recipients relinquish neither
their custodial authority to make decisions concerning
the physical and economic welfare of their children nor
their rights to receive monies collected. In the
overwhelming majority of IV-D cases, the custodial
parent is not receiving public assistance and is entitled to
support payments collected by the state."' Public
assistance recipients are entitled to pass through
payments as well as any payments collected in excess of
the amount of assistance paid out. According party status
to custodial parents gives parents the opportunity to
exercise their constitutional right to rear their children,
protect their pecuniary interests, and act in a
representative capacity on behalf of their children. As
parties, custodial parents should be afforded due process
rights in judicial and administrative proceedings
including the right to notice of all conferences and
proceedings, the right to participate in such proceedings,
and the right to appeal administrative and judicial
determinations.
In order to avail themselves of opportunities to
participate in IV-D cases, custodial parents must
understand their rights. They must be fully aware of the
boundaries of the relationship between IV-D agencies
and parents so that they do not rely on agencies to
represent their interests. Child support agencies must
clearly and thoroughly explain that attorney-client
privilege does not attach and conflicts of interest may
arise in IV-D cases, giving examples and simple
explanations of these concepts to ensure that parents
understand the limits of the relationship. In addition,
parents need to be educated about the potential
consequences of their failure to become involved in IV-
D cases, including prohibitions on relitigation and
retroactive modification of support awards. While
securing child support for low-income families is an
important public policy goal,337 the process by which the
state collects support should not obscure the
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representational role of state IV-D agencies or eviscerate
the rights of parents who are best suited to protect the
interests of their children.
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assignment of rights to collect support as a condition of
receiving public benefits is in effect, "[u]nless the custodial
parent and child(ren) have satisfactory health insurance
other than Medicaid" [emphasis added], the IV-D agency
must "petition the court or administrative authority to
include health insurance that is available to the non-
custodial parent at reasonable cost in new or modified court
or administrative orders for support." Id. Reasonable cost
insurance is defined in 45 C.F.R. § 303.31(a)(1) (2006) as
any employment-related or other group health insurance. 45
C.F.R. § 303.8(d) (2006) concerns modification of support
orders and states that "[i]n no event shall the eligibility for
or receipt of Medicaid be considered to meet the need to
provide for the child's health care needs in the order."
97 45 C.F.R. § 303.31(b).
98 Children who receive Medicaid qualify for Early and
Periodic Screening, Diagnostic, and Treatment (EPSDT)
services. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(4)(B) (2006). EPSDT
services include: lead toxicity screening, vision services,
hearing services and dental services. Id. at § 1396d(r). If the
screening shows a need for further diagnostic services or
treatment, such health care services must be provided. Ctrs.
for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., U.S. Dep't of Health &
Human Servs., EPSDT Benefits, <http:/Avww.cmhhs.gov/
MedicaidEarlyPeriodicScrn/02_Benefits.asp#Top
O fPage> (last visited Dec. 18, 2006).
99 45 C.F.R. § 303.31(c) (2006).
'o' Id. § 303.3 1(b)(5) (2006).
10' Id. § 303.32(c)(8) (2006).
102 Fines, supra note 32, at 2181.
103 Even if a non-public assistance custodial parent has
assigned her right to pursue and collect support, she retains
her right to receive the payments and therefore has a strong
pecuniary interest in the IV-D case. See supra notes 61-64.
Courts have recognized the significant interest custodial
parents who do not receive public assistance have in IV-D
cases. In Maxwell v. State of Arkansas Child Support
Enforcement Unit, the Arkansas Court of Appeals found
that a custodial parent who had previously received public
assistance but was no longer receiving assistance had the
right to enter into a private agreement with the non-
custodial parent that limited receipt of future child support
in exchange for payment of a lump sum. Maxwell v. State
of Ark. Child Support Enforcement, 16 S.W. 293, 294-95
(Ark. Ct. App. 2000). The court held that the state agency
does not have "unfettered authority to exercise its right of
standing in the absence of some showing that the State has
some interest, current or potential." Id. at 297.
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104 See PAULA ROBERTS & MICHELLE VINSON, CTR. FOR
LAW AND SOC. POLICY, STATE POLICY REGARDING PASS-
THROUGH AND DISREGARD OF CURRENT MONTH'S CHILD
SUPPORT COLLECTED FOR FAMILIES RECEIVING TANF-
FUNDED CASH ASSISTANCE (2001) available at
<http://www.clasp.org/publications/pass thru3.pdf.> The
District of Columbia has enacted a statute allowing public
assistance families to collect a pass-through of up to
$150.00. D.C. Code § 4-205.19(5) (2001).
"' 42 U.S.C. § 657(a)(1)(B) (2006).
106 The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Responsibility Act (PRWORA) established a sixty-month
time limit on receipt of TANF benefits. 42 U.S.C.
§ 608(a)(7)(A) (2006). States can elect to use state funds to
continue providing benefits beyond the sixty month time
period but states can not use federal funds for this purpose.
Id. § 608(a)(7)(F).
107 45 C.F.R. § 302.32(b)(2)(ii) (2006).
108 Id. §§ 305.2 & 305.4.
109 Over the past fifteen years, I have assisted clients who
have IV-D cases in Washington D.C or whose IV-D cases
have been transferred to other states. During this time,
custodial parents have relayed the difficulties they have had
in reporting employment information to IV-D agencies. I
have experienced these same difficulties as have law
students working under my supervision on child support
cases. For example, when trying to reach caseworkers,
clients frequently encounter cumbersome voice mail
systems in which voice mail boxes are often full.
10 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-809 (2006).
1 See, e.g., W.M. v. D.S.C., 591 A.2d 837, 843 (D.C.
1991); J.A.W. v. D.M.E., 591 A.2d 844, 848 (D.C. 1991).
112 A party may have to produce evidence, including
testimony, to demonstrate that the non-custodial parent had
an ability to pay during the period in question and to
substantiate that the custodial parent incurred expenses for
the child during this time period.
113 45 C.F.R. § 303.100(a)(5) (2006).
114 See discussion of representation policies supra Part
111. 1.
115 For purposes of this analysis, I will refer to
Washington, D.C. as a state rather than a city. OCSE
categorizes D.C. as a state for purposes of providing federal
funding and monitoring the D.C. IV-D agency.
116 See infra notes 138-42.
1,7 42 U.S.C. §§ 654(12) & (12)(A) (2006) (emphasis
added).
118 Id. § 666(a)(10)(A).
119 Id. § 666(a)(10)(A)(ii) (2006) (emphasis added). See
also 45 C.F.R. §§ 303.8(b)(2) & (b)(5) (2006).
120 Similarly, under federal law, each state is to enact
laws authorizing expedited procedures for establishing and
enforcing support including procedures requiring "each
party to any paternity or child support proceeding" to file
with the state identifying information including social
security number, residential and mailing addresses, and
phone numbers. 42 U.S.C. §§ 666(c)(2)(A)(i) & (ii) (2006)
(emphasis added.) The language appears to include
custodial parents under the rubric of parties.
121 45 C.F.R. §§ 303.101(c)(2) & (c)(3) (discussing
safeguards in expedited processes). The regulations require
that "[t]he due process rights of the parties involved must
be protected" and "[tihe parties must be provided a copy of
the voluntary acknowledgment of paternity, paternity
determination, and/or support order." Id. It is not clear how
much legal significance is given to the term "parties." In
other sections of these regulations, the term "parties" is
used in a more lay fashion to refer to individuals or
agencies who have entered into cooperative arrangements
or agreements. See, e.g., id. § 303.107(c).
122 In addition, in these regulations, the non-custodial
parent is referred to as the defendant but there is no mention
of a plaintiff. Id. § 303.101(d)(4). The regulations also
authorize a state to seek an exemption from these
procedural requirements and safeguards "on the basis of the
effectiveness and timeliness of paternity establishment,
support order issuance or enforcement within the political
subdivision . .. ." Id. § 303.101(e).
123 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT DIV., OFFICE OF THE
CORP. COUNSEL OF D.C., REVISED NEW REPRESENTATION
POLICY 9 (on file with author) [hereinafter D.C.
REPRESENTATION POLICY]. This policy applies to
individuals who have applied for IV-D services after
October 16, 2000, and have had no prior relationship with
the agency. Id. at 2.
124 Id. at 11-12.
125 See, e.g., Massachusetts and Idaho. In Idaho, the state
child support enforcement agency is required to provide
services to any "petitioner" in a support proceeding who
seeks such services. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 7-1019(1) (2006).
The obligor is referred to as the "respondent" and the
statute provides that the agency must make a reasonable
effort to gather information concerning the income of "the
parties," referring to the petitioner and the respondent. Id.
§ 7-1019(2)(c). In addition, the agency is to send the
petitioner a copy of any written communication received
from the respondent or his attorney within two days of
receipt of the communication. Id. § 7-1019(2)(e). However,
there is no discussion of custodial parents' rights to
participate in proceedings nor is there any explicit
discussion of their party status.
126 MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 1 19A, § 3(a) (2006).
127 id.
128 New York State Division of Child Support
Enforcement Partners for Children Website, Support
Establishment: The Pre-Court Stage, <http://www.
trainingspace.org/cse/moduleO 1/05_supEst/_pg05_stage_ 1.
cfm> (last visited Dec. 20, 2006).
129 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 11 -b(2-a). In assignment
cases, the Department of Social Services is required to send
notice to the assignor explaining her right "to be kept
informed, upon request, of the time, date and place of any
proceedings involving the assignor and such other
information as the department believes is pertinent." Id.
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(emphasis added). Yet, New York regulations adopt the
federal requirements for modification of support orders
which include references to custodial parents as parties. See
18 NY ADC § 347.26(a)(3).
130 OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.015 & 416.407(1)(2) (2006).
See also OR. ADMIN. R. § 137-055-1040 (2006) ("In any
action taken under ORS 25.080, the State of Oregon, the
obligor, and the obligee are parties.").
131 CAL. FAM. CODE § 17404(a) (2006).
132 Id. § 17404(e) (2006). This provision regarding party
status applies to parents who are receiving or have
requested services after December 31, 1996. Id. In cases
that began before this date, the parent does not become a
party to the action until the court issues an order permitting
joinder pursuant to an ex parte or noticed motion filed by
the support agency or either parent. Id
In the absence of a statute or regulation, materials
distributed by the IV-D agency can shed light on whether or
not custodial parents are considered parties. See, e.g., Div.
of Child Support (DCS), State of Washington, Application
for NonAssistance Support Enforcement Services 3 (Rev.
July 2000).
133 42 U.S.C. § 654(12) (2006).
134 Id. § 654(12)(B).
35 45 C.F.R. § 303.101(c)(2) (2006).
136 Id. § 303.101(c)(3).
137 See generally, GARDINER ET AL., supra note 26
(finding that the judicial states and quasi-judicial states
primarily use in-person service of process while the
administrative states are more likely to use certified mail to
serve non-custodial parents).
138 OR. REV. STAT. § 416.415(l)(a)(b) (2005).
139 Id. § 416.407(l)(b). The notice requirement applies in
the proceedings outlined in 416.400-416.470. See also Id.
§ 416.415.
140 CAL. FAM. CODE § 17406(f)(1)(A) (2006).
141 Id. §§ 17404(e)(3) & 17406(f)(1)(B). When issuing
written notice or serving pleadings, the agency or Attorney
General must include the following language:
It may be important that you attend the hearing. The
local child support agency does not represent you or
your children. You may have information about the
other parent, such as information about his or her
income or assets that will not be presented to the
court unless you attend the hearing. You have the
right to attend the hearing and to be heard in court
and tell the court what you think the court should do
with the child support order. This hearing could
change your rights or your children's rights to
support.
Id. § 17406(f)(1)(C). The statute also requires that
recipients of IV-D services receive notice of any support or
modification order procured by the IV-D agency or
Attorney General. Id. § 17406(g).
142 In Pennsylvania, for example, the court is to provide
all parties to a support action and their attorneys with notice
of child support establishment or modification proceedings
as well as copies of any support orders. PA. STAT. ANN.
§ 1910.6 (2006). See also, D.C. CODE § 46-206(d) (2001).
In some jurisdictions, the state notice requirements are
more stringent than the federal requirements. In Tennessee,
for example, the department of human services is required
to inform the custodial parent of her right to intervene in the
action to protect her future interests. TENN. CODE. ANN.
§ 71-3-124(a)(5) (2006).
143 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.2563(4) (2006).
'4 Id. § 409.2563(4)(o).
145 Id. The department is to send both parents a copy of
the proposed administrative support order and documents
used to calculate the proposed amount. Id.
§ 409.2563(4)(g).
'46 Id. § 409.2563(10)(a).
147 N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 111 -b(2-a).
148 42 U.S.C. § 654(12) (2006).
149 Federal regulations recognize the right of custodial
parents to participate in certain proceedings. For example,
in the provisions concerning automatic wage withholding,
the regulations state that a non-custodial parent's wages
will be subject to withholding, regardless of whether
arrearage is owed, unless "(i) [elither the non-custodial or
custodial parent demonstrates and the court or
administrative authority finds, that there is good cause not
to require immediate withholding . . . ." 45 C.F.R.
§ 303. 100(b)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).
150 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 416.415(2)(f) (2006).
"' Id. § 416 .415(2 )(g).
152 Id. Some state IV-D agencies use application forms or
other informational materials to inform custodial parents
that they may participate in child support proceedings.
However, these materials do not define the term
"participate." See, e.g., Child Support Servs., State of
Alaska, Custodian's Application for Services and
Information About Child Support Services 4 (Rev. May 19,
2004), available ;at <http://www.csed.state.ak.us/
Forms/forms.asp> [hereinafter Alaska Application].
153 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.2563(2)(c) (2006). Either
parent retains the right to file a civil action in circuit court
seeking adjudication of child support issues; however, the
department itself is only required to terminate the
administrative proceeding and move to circuit court if the
non-custodial parent requests such a transfer. Id.
§§ 409.2563(2)(d) & (f).
'54 Id. §§ 409.2563(5)(c) & (6).
155 Id. § 409.2563(6).
156 D.C. REPRESENTATION POLICY, supra note 123, at 18.
157 FLA. STAT. ANN. §4009.2561(1).
158 Colo. Child Support Enforcement, Application for
Child Support Enforcement (CSE) Services 6 (Rev. Feb.
2003). According to the policy of the IV-D agency in the
District of Columbia, a custodial parent cannot dictate the
strategy or outcome to be pursued in a court action. D.C.
REPRESENTATION POLICY, supra note 123, at 13.
159 In Vermont, the state child support agency can request
a modification of a child support order at any time if the
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custodial parent is a public assistance recipient. VT. OFFICE
OF CHILD SUPPORT, PARENT HANDBOOK-CHAPTER 2:
OBTAINING OR CHANGING CHILD SUPPORT IN VERMONT 8,
<http://www.ocs. state.vt.us//handbook/chapter2.htm> (last
visited Dec. 20, 2006) [hereinafter VT. HANDBOOK CH. 2].
However, in a non-public assistance case, the agency must
have the consent of the parent who applied for services
before it can request a modification. Id.
160 CAL. FAM. CODE § 17404(e)(4) (2006). However,
California law authorizes a parent who is receiving IV-D
services to file an independent action to modify a support
order so long as the IV-D agency is served with notice of
such action. Id. § 17404(0(1). The parent receiving IV-D
services may also independently file to enforce a support
order so long as she receives the written consent of the
agency to take such action. Id. § 17404(f)(2).
161 Id. § 174060). See also Carlson v. Eassa, 62 Cal. Rptr.
2d 884, 891 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) ("[I]n a case not involving
public assistance, settlement of a child support issue should
not be undertaken without the consent of all parties to the
action.").
162 In re M.C.R., 55 S.W.3d 104, 107 (Tex. App. 2001).
The state objected to the court's determination concerning
the accrual of interest on arrearage. Id. at 106-07.
163 Id. at 107.
164 Id. But see Cantin v. Young, 742 A.2d 1246, 1247 (Vt.
1999). The court in Cantin found that in child support cases
in which there is no assignment, the custodial parent is a
real party in interest and that the state does not have
independent authority to appeal unless there is a statute
authorizing the agency to intervene independently to protect
state interests. Id.
165 OR. REV. STAT. § 416.427(6)(7) (2003).
'66 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.2563(10) (2006).
167 id.
168 See, e.g., WYO. CHILD SUPPORT RULES, supra note 50,
at 4-5 ("ECSD shall determine, in consultation with the
Office of the Attorney General, whether to appeal an
adverse decision. Decisions to appeal shall be based on the
best interest of the State of Wyoming.").
169 TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-3-124(d) (2006). California
requires that recipients of IV-D services be given notice of
limitations on confidentiality and conflicts. CAL. FAM.
CODE § 17406(c) (2005). The notice must include "the
advice that the absence of an attorney-client relationship
means that communications from the recipient are not
privileged and that the local child support agency or
Attorney General may provide support enforcement
services to the other parent in the future." Id. This notice
must be presented in easily understandable English, in bold
typeface, and translated into another language if necessary.
Id. See also MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW, § 10-115(o
(2006); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 231.09 (2005); ALA.
CODE § 38-10-7.1 (2006); and FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.2567
(2005).
170 Under federal law, the application for services is
supposed to include: information describing the IV-D
services available, applicant's rights and responsibilities,
fees charged, and cost recovery and distribution policies. 45
C.F.R. § 303.2(a)(2) (2006). This information must be
provided to all IV-A, Medicaid, and IV-E foster care
applicants or recipients within five days of referral to the
IV-D agency. Id.
171 Bureau of Child Support, Wis. Dep't of Workforce
Dev., Parent Application for Child Support Services 5
(2004), available at <http://www.dwd.state.wi.us/bcs/>
[hereinafter Wisconsin Application]. But see Child Support
Enforcement Admin., Md. Dep't of Human Res.,
Application for Support Enforcement Services, available at
<http://www.dhr.state.md.us/csea.htm>. The Maryland
application notifies the applicant that the information he or
she provides to the agency may not be treated as
confidential and that failure to appear in court pursuant to
an order or subpoena could lead to arrest. Id.
172 See Child Support Enforcement Div., State of Ala.,
Application for Child Support Services 4-5 (1995),
available at <http://www.dhr.state.al.us> (explaining that the
recipient's interests may coincide with the state's interest
but, if they do not, the recipient is told that she may wish to
hire a private attorney). There is no explanation as to what
types of conflicts of interest might arise. Id. at 5.
173 See, e.g., Child Support Enforcement Div., D.C.
Office of the Corp. Counsel, Basic Services Package 2
available at <http://csed.dc.gov/csed/frames.asp?doc=
/csed/lib/csed/servicepack.pdf>. There is a D.C. form entitled
"Notice of Legal Representation" that warns that
information provided to the agency attorneys is not
protected by the attorney-client privilege but the form does
not explain or define the concept of privilege. Id. But see
Alaska Application, supra note 152, at 4. In the Alaska
materials, the state agency informs the applicant that the
agency may be required to release information about the
applicant to other parties or agencies and that if the case is
filed in court, the information in the court case may be
accessible to the public. Id. There are no examples
provided, but the language at least puts the applicant on
notice that all information provided to the agency or its
attorneys will not be kept confidential.
174 Fla. Dep't of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement
Application for Services (2002), available at <h t t p : / /
www.myflorida.com/dor/childsupport/instruction
.html> [hereinafter Florida Application].
175 Id. (emphasis added).
176 Information concerning individuals receiving IV-D
services can be reported to another agency or official if it
relates to "known or suspected instances of physical or
mental injury, child abuse, sexual abuse or exploitation, or
negligent treatment or maltreatment of a child who is the
subject of a support enforcement activity under
circumstances which indicate that the child's health or
welfare is threatened . . . ." FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 409.2579(l)(d) (2005) (safeguarding Title IV-D case file
information).
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177 California is one of the few states that not only
recognizes that limitations on confidentiality exist and that
conflicts can arise, but also requires that recipients of IV-D
services be given notice of such possibilities. CAL. FAM.
CODE § 17406(c) (2005).
178 DEP'T OF FAMILY SERVS., A GUIDE TO WYOMING'S
CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM 5 available at
<http://dfsweb.state.wy.us/csehome/booklet/booklethtn>
[hereinafter WYOMING GUIDE].
7 9 See id. at 3.
180 Id. at 3-4.
181 Or. Child Support Program, Application for Child
Support Services 3 (2006), available at <http://dcs.state.
or.us/forms/csf030574.pdf>.
182 The Vermont Parent Handbook mentions that a
conflict of interest might arise between the state and the
parent. However, the materials do not define conflict of
interest nor do they provide examples of such a conflict.
VT. HANDBOOK CH. 2, supra note 159, at 2. In addition,
although the handbook provides detailed information on a
variety of topics, the language used is complicated. VT.
OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT, PARENT HANDBOOK-
CHAPTER 8: PARENTS' RIGHTS IN OCS CASES 5,
<http://www.ocs.state.vt.us//handbook/chapter8.htm> (last
visited Dec. 20, 2006).
183 The failure of IV-D agency attorneys and staff to
adequately inform custodial parents of the agency
representation policy and its implications is not a recent
development. In the late 1970's, the Oregon Court of
Appeals described the findings of a lower court concerning
lax practices of the state child support agency. Gibson v.
Johnson, 582 P.2d 452, 454 (Or. Ct. App. 1978). The court
noted that:
During consultation with the recipient the SED [the
state IV-D child support agency] rarely advises the
recipient of the right, under certain circumstances, to
refuse cooperation, that the recipient can consult
private counsel or that the assistant attorney general
assigned to SED represents the state and not the
recipient. If the SED attorney obtains information
which indicates fraud in the receipt of ADC [public
assistance], this information is transmitted to the
PWD for its use in fraud or eligibility investigations.
The recipient is usually not advised how information
obtained during the consultation may be used.
Id. at 454. The court went on to point out that "[e]vidence
presented by plaintiff indicated members of plaintiffs class
[public assistance recipients] were confused as to whether
the SED attorneys were acting as their counsel." Id.
184 During the fifteen years that I have represented parents
in child support proceedings in Washington, D.C., I have
heard former or current IV-D customers express a complete
lack of understanding of the role of the IV-D attorney. They
often believe that the IV-D attorney is "their attorney" or is
in court to represent their interests.
'8s5 See, e.g., Okla. Dep't of Human Servs. v. T.D.G., 861
P.2d 990, 993 (Okla. 1993) ("Public policy demands that, in
matters of support, the best interest of the child be
paramount.").
186 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 516 (8th ed. 2004) ("Real
party in interest. A person entitled under the substantive law
to enforce the right sued upon and who generally, but not
necessarily, benefits from the action's final outcome.").
187 JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR
R. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 339-40 (4th ed. 2005).
188 The requirement that a party be a "real party in
interest" applies to both original plaintiffs as well as to
individuals who intervene or who are joined in an action.
Id. at 340. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure articulate
this requirement, as do most state rules of civil procedure.
FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a) ("[E]very action shall be prosecuted
in the name of the real party in interest."). Many of these
rules allow guardians to sue in their own names without
joining the party who stands to benefit from the action.
FRIEDENTHAL, KANE & MILLER, supra note 187, at 341.
189 See supra Parts III. 1 & 2.
'90 Id. The IV-D agency makes procedural decisions
concerning paternity and child support cases that impact the
amount of child support ordered. Parents should have an
opportunity to voice views contrary to the agency positions
on procedural matters. For example, decisions regarding
how to pursue interstate cases-whether by transferring the
case to the state where the non-custodial parent resides or
handling the case by long arm jurisdiction from the state in
which the child resides-implicate choice of law questions
that affect the amount of support obtained as well as the
number of years support can be collected. See 45 C.F.R.
§ 303.7(b)(1) (2006). In addition, a custodial parent's
ability to participate in an interstate case and provide
information to the IV-D agency is impacted greatly by the
determination of where to litigate the case. Custodial
parents (particularly in non-public assistance cases) should
have an opportunity to address these issues and determine
whether they wish to continue IV-D services.






197 Some courts use language that suggests that in public
assistance cases, the custodial parent is executing a full
assignment. For example, in Lamier v. Lamier, the Ohio
appellate court found that "[w]here the mother has assigned
rights to a government agency and suffers no loss, she is not
a party in interest and therefore may not sue for collection
of past support due." 664 N.E.2d 1384, 1387 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1995).
198 See supra Part 111.2.
199 42 U.S.C. § 657(a)(1) (2001).
200 Id.
201 See supra note 115.
20242 U.S.C. § 654(12) (1999).
203 45 C.F.R. § 302.32(b)(2)(ii) (2006).
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204 42 U.S.C. § 654(1 1)(b) (1999) (eligibility for Title IV-
D services); 45 C.F.R. 302.33 (2006).
205 Beggin v. Beggin, 19 B.R. 759, 761 (Bankr. W.D.
Wash. 1982).
206 Id. (citing In re Sturgell, 19 B.R. 59, 67 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio, 1980); In re Gilbert, 10 B.R. 462, 464 (Barkr. N.D.
Ind. 1981); and In re Deblock, 11 B.R. 51, 54 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1981)). But see Arkansas Office of Child Support
Enforcement v. Terry, 985 S.W.2d 711, 716-17 (Ark.
1999). The court in Terry noted that "[tihe collection of
child support ultimately benefits the State by providing for
the financial needs of its children, without having to resort
to public funds to do so." Id. at 716. Once the custodian
assigns child support rights to the state, "the state has a
pecuniary interest in enforcing those rights even though the
amounts collected on behalf of those assignors who are not
receiving public assistance will ultimately pass from the
State to the assignors and their children." Id. at 717.
207 FRIEDENTHAL, KANE & MILLER, supra note 187, at
340.
20' See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16.914 (2006). In the case of
an unmarried couple, both the biological father and mother
have rights, pursuant to state statutes or common law, to
custody of their children. However, whether unmarried
fathers have a fundamental right to custody that cannot be
terminated without a showing of unfitness depends upon the
degree of involvement with the child and the marital status
of the mother. Supreme Court cases addressing this issue
come to differing, sometimes irreconcilable, conclusions.
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 88, at 773-76 (discussing
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972), Lehr v.
Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983) and Michael H. v.
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 126 (1989)).
209 JOHN DEWITT GREGORY, PETER N. SWISHER &
SHERYL L. WOLF, UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW 463
(2001) [hereinafter GREGORY ET AL.].
210 HOMER H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC
RELATIONS 313-14 (1988); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT,
ARTHUR RAPHAEL MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE VOL. 6A § 1570 (2d ed. 2006).
211 CLARK, supra note 210, at 313-14. If a parent refuses
to take action on behalf of a child or if the parent's interests
conflict with those of the child, a court has the authority to
appoint a special representative or a guardian ad litem to
protect the child's interests. WRIGHT, MILLER, & KANE,
supra note 210, at 498-99 (citing T.W. v. Brophy, 124 F.3d
893, 895 (7th Cir. 1997) ("To maintain a suit in a federal
court, a child or mental incompetent must be represented by
a competent adult.")).
212 See supra text accompanying footnotes 92-100. See
also GUGGENHEIM ET AL., supra note 89, at 4.
213 GUGGENHEIM ET AL., supra note 89, at 4-5. See
GREGORY ET. AL., supra note 209, at 421, 463. State
statutes and rules of procedure provide definitions of the
term custody. See, e.g., PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 1915.1
(2006) (defining custody as "the legal right to keep, control,
guard, care for and preserve a child"). Legal custody is
defined as the "legal right to make major decisions
affecting the best interests of a minor child, including but
not limited to, medical, religious and educational
decisions." Id. Physical custody is defined as "actual
physical possession and control of a child." Id.214 See supra Parts 11.2 & IV. 1 .
215 See, e.g., Allen v. Allen, 292 P.2d 581, 583 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1956) (citing Metson v. Metson, 132 P.2d 513, 515
(Cal. Ct. App. 1942));, 427 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1952).
216 GUGGENHEIM ET AL., supra note 89, at 98 (citing
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)).
217 Id. (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652-53
(1972)). The United States Supreme Court has held that in
order to terminate parental rights, the government must
prove allegations of parental unfitness by clear and
convincing evidence. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,
746 (1982). See also CHEMERINKSY, supra note 88, at 772-
73 (discussing custody as a fundamental right).
218 See infra note 241.
219 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
220 FRIEDENTHAL, KANE & MILLER, supra note 187, at
347. At the federal level, the doctrine of standing is
grounded in the constitutional requirement that courts may
adjudicate only "cases or controversies." Id. at 347-48
(discussing Article III of the U.S. Constitution and citing
Seldin, 422 U.S. at 501). In determining whether a plaintiff
has standing to sue in federal court, the plaintiff must
(1) show that he or she has suffered an injury (or that injury
is imminent); (2) allege that the defendant's conduct caused
the plaintiff's injury; and (3) allege that a favorable deci-
sion in the matter would redress the plaintiffs harm or
injury. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 88, at 62. State courts are
not bound by the case or controversy requirement of Article
III though they may be bound by similar provisions in state
constitutions. NORMAN REDLICH, JOHN ATTANASIO & JOEL
K. GOLDSTEIN, UNDERSTANDING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 64
(2005).
221 FRIEDENTHAL, KANE & MILLER, supra note 187, at
348.
222 For example, under the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil
Procedure, several categories of individuals or agencies are
authorized to bring an action seeking child support
including: a person to whom a duty of support is owed; a
person having custody of a minor child; a person caring for
a minor child regardless of whether the person has legal
custody; or "a public body or private agency having an
interest in the case, maintenance or assistance of a person to
whom a duty of support is owing." PA. STAT. ANN.
§ 1910.3 (1981). See also CAL. FAM. CODE § 17404(a)
(2004); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 422 (2006) (persons who
may originate proceedings). N.Y. courts have held that both
a custodial parent and the Commmissioner of Social
Services may initiate separate paternity cases at the same
time. Terese C. v. Barry C., 466 N.Y.S.2d 174, 174 (N.Y.
Fam. Ct. 1983).
223 Courts have explained that the state IV-D agency
"stands in place of the [custodial parent] ... and, therefore,
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has standing to seek enforcement of the [non-custodial
parent's] obligation . . . ." Fla. Dep't of Revenue v.
Lockmiller, 791 So. 2d 552, 553 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
However, there is no discussion as to whether the custodial
parent retains any rights or interests in the support matter.
224 See supra Part 11.2 & text accompanying notes 193-
205.
2' FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a) requires that "[e]very action
shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest."
It goes on to clarify, however, that "[a]n executor,
administrator, guardian, bailee, trust of an express trust, a
party with whom or in whose name a contract has been
made for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by
statute may sue in that person's own name without joining
the party for whose benefit the action is brought." Id.
226 See, e.g., County of Tulare v. Boggs, 146 Cal. App. 3d
236, 241 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). A California Court of
Appeals found that the minor child does not need to be
made a formal party to the proceeding, though the child is a
real party in interest. Id. The court cited a California statute
that authorizes the district attorney to bring a child support
action in the name of the county on behalf of a minor child.
Id. (citing CAL.WELF. & INST. CODE § 11350.1 (2000)).
This statute, according to the court, does not require that a
guardian ad litem be appointed for the child. Id. The court
rejected the appellant's argument that the county is
incapable of acting in a "proper representative capacity"
because the appellant failed to present evidence that a
conflict of interest existed between the state and the child.
Id. at 243. In the absence of such evidence, the court found
that the District Attorney protected the child's interests in
the proceeding. Id.
227 FRIEDENTHAL, KANE & MILLER, supra note 187, at
356. The court always has discretion to join a party under
the more flexible permissive joinder standard, but such
joinder is not required. Id. at 350-54. Under most state
procedural rules as well as under the Federal Rules, a court
may grant permissive joinder when (1) a person asserts a
right to relief "arising out of the transaction or occurrence
or a series of transactions or occurrences that comprise the
subject matter of the action" (or the person who has had
such a claim asserted against him) and (2) there are
common questions of law or fact among the individuals to
be joined and existing parties to the action. FED. R. Civ. P.
20(a). All of the arguments in favor of compulsory joinder
of custodial parents would also justify a grant of permissive
joinder.
228 A necessary party is one who should be joined in the
suit if feasible but failure or inability to join this party will
not lead to dismissal of the action. FRIEDENTHAL, KANE &
MILLER, supra note 187, at 355. An indispensable party, on
the other hand, must be joined to the lawsuit and failure to
join the individual is so prejudicial to his or her rights or the
rights of other parties to the action that the court must
dismiss the case. Id.
229 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 19(a) (2006)
(joinder of persons needed for just adjudication); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. IV, § 19(a) (2006).
230 FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a). The Joinder of Persons Needed
for Just Adjudication rule also requires that the person to be
joined must be subject to service of process and his or her
joinder may iot deprive the court of jurisdiction. Id. If the
person to be joined objects to the joinder, the court may
make that person a defendant or an involuntary plaintiff. Id.
231 Id. In Provident Tradesmen Bank & Trust v.
Patterson, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance
of considering practical rather than theoretical ramifications
when determining the impact on the nonparty of failure to
join him or her in the action. 390 U.S. 102, 118-19 (1968).
The standard is not so strict as to limit joinder to cases in
which the nonparty will be bound by res judicata or
collateral estoppel from relitigating the case. Even in
situations where the individual may be permitted to bring
suit at a later date, if the pending litigation threatens the
nonparty's ability to bring or defend against a future action,
then he or she is a necessary party. FRIEDENTHAL, KANE &
MILLER, supra note 187, at 360.
232 FRIEDENTHAL, KANE & MILLER, supra note 187, at
357, 359. Individuals may be bound because they are found
to be in privity with a party to the action. Id. Even if an
individual is not in privity and therefore cannot be bound by
the decision, joinder may be appropriate where the absentee
person's rights or claims will be impaired by the judgment.
Id. at 359.
233 Id.
234 See id. at 339 (citing Boris v. Moore, 152 F. Supp. 595
(E.D. Wis. 1957) aff'd on other grounds, 253 F.2d 523 (7th
Cir. 1958)).
235 Provident Tradesmen Bank & Trust v. Patterson, 390
U.S. at 123. See WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 210,
Vol. 7 § 1601 (3d ed.) (citing Osborne v. Campbell, 37
F.R.D. 339, 342 (S.D.W. Va. 1965)). The Osborne court
found that to adjudicate the rights of the principal
beneficiary of a will in her absence (in an action to set will
aside) "would not only be inconsistent with equity and good
conscience, but would be a violation of due process." Id.
See also FRIEDENTHAL, KANE & MILLER, supra note 187,
at 360 (citing Britton v. Green 325 F.2d 377, 382-83 (10th
Cir. 1963)); Mark Dunning Indus., Inc. v. Cheney, 934 F.2d
266, 269 (11 th Cir. 1991); Calcote v. Tex. Pac. Coal & Oil
Co., 157 F.2d 216, 224 (5th Cir. 1946). Other constitutional
issues have been suggested related to nonjoinder of
necessary parties in which, as a result of the nonjoinder, the
defendant can be subject to multiple liability, and if such
multiple liability could require the defendant to pay the
same debt more than once, it could be considered a taking
without due process of law. WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE,
supra note 210, Vol. 7 § 1602 (3d ed.) (citing W. Union
Telegraph Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71, 75-77 (1961)).236 See supra Part 111.2.
Children's Legal Rights Journal
The Role of Custodial Parents in the IV-D Child Support Process
237 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMIN. LAW TREATISE, Vol.
1 § 8.2, at 530 (2002) (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254, 267-68 (1970)).
238 Id. at 531, 560. The Federal Administrative Procedure
Act mandates that when a statute calls for an administrative
determination based on a "hearing," an agency must
(i) allow a party to be represented by an attorney or
representative; (ii) permit a person to obtain a copy of data
or evidence; and (iii) provide a brief statement explaining
why the agency has denied an application or petition. Id. If
an administrative agency action deprives a person of life,
liberty, or property, then the Constitution requires that the
agency adopt and implement procedural safeguards. Id.
§ 9.4, at 578-79.
239 Id. at 561 (citing Paul. R. Verkuil, A Study of Informal
Adjudication Procedures, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 739 (1976)).
240 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
241 id.
242 See supra Part IV. 1.
243 OCSE ATTORNEY HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 147-
59, 172, 175-80.
244 See Fines, supra note 32, at 2181; Murphy, supra note
38, at 361-65.
245 See supra Part IV.2.B.
246 See supra Part 111. 1.
247 42 U.S.C. § 654(12)(a).
248 See supra Part 11. 1.
249 Whether an interested person who is not a party to the
action (i.e., someone other than the respondent, applicant,
or petitioner) can participate in the action depends upon the
type of proceeding at issue. PIERCE, supra note 237, at
1201. The federal APA does not specify what rights
interested parties have to join or participate in
administrative adjudications. Pierce suggests that APA
§ 555(b) addresses this issue. This section provides that
"[s]o far as the orderly conduct of public business permits,
an interested person may appear before an agency or its
responsible employees for the presentation, adjustment, or
determination of an issue, request, or controversy in a
proceeding . . . ." 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (2005). See also
UNIFORM LAW COMMISSIONERS' MODEL STATE ADMIN.
PROCEDURE ACT § 4-209 (1981), available at <http',/www.
j apc.state. fl.us/publications/USAPA/MSAPA 1981 .pdf>
(authorizing the filing of petitions for intervention).250 See infra Parts V.2.B & C.
251 Gill v. Ripley, 724 A.2d 88, 102 (Md. 1999).
252 Id. at 89. In this case, the mother was considered a
party and had been actively involved in the case. Id. at 89-
90. She alleged that the attorneys and personnel of the IV-D
agency avoided her calls, would not meet with her, and
signed a consent order despite her objection to a dismissal
with prejudice. Id. at 89. Therefore, mere involvement in
one's case does not ensure that the IV-D agency will take
appropriate action, but it at least preserves the custodial
parent's ability to uncover and object to any inappropriate
action.
253 Id. at 96, 102.
254 Id. at 97-98.
255 Id. at 101-02 (citing Hanson v. Flores, 486 N.W.2d
294 (Iowa 1992); Origel v. Washtenaw County, 549 F.
Supp. 792 (E.D. Mich. 1982); Johnson v. Granholm, 662
F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1981), cert.denied, 457 U.S. 1120
(1982); Duerscherl v. Foley, 681 F. Supp. 1364 (D. Minn.
1987), aff'd, 845 F.2d 1027 (8th Cir. 1988); Kaplan v.
LaBarvera, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 903 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997);
Clifford v. Marion County Pros. Att'y., 654 N.E.2d 805
(Ind. Ct. App. 1995)). See also Jager v. County of
Alameda,10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 293, 294-95 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)
(noting that, despite the plaintiffs allegation that county
district attorney and county employees acted negligently in
its handling of a support enforcement matter, the attorney
and county employees enjoy absolute immunity from
liability because their actions were undertaken within the
scope of their employment).
26 42 U.S.C. § 654(12)(a).
257 State applications for IV-D services require applicants
to provide a valid address. See, e.g., Florida Application,
supra note 174; Wisconsin Application, supra note 171, at
5. In addition, once a child support order is entered, both
parents are required "to file with the state case registry upon
entry of an order, and to update as appropriate, information
on location and identity of the party, including . .
residential and mailing addresses . . . ." 42 U.S.C.
§ 666(c)(2)(A). Therefore, the state should be able to
provide notice by mail and, as provided in § 666(c)(2)(A),
the address provided by the applicant should be deemed as
a valid address for purposes of satisfying due process notice
requirements.
258 See supra Part IV.3.
259 If increased custodial parent participation leads to
more protracted cases or fewer cases disposed through
settlement, then the costs to the courts and the government
could increase. However, the liberty and pecuniary interests
at stake as well as the public interest in securing adequate
financial and medical support for children outweigh the
possible costs of increased parental participation.
Automatically according party status to custodial parents
would not force parents to participate in greater numbers
but would allow those who have interests they wish to
protect to do so.
260 Monterey County v. Comejo, 812 P.2d 586, 595-96
(Cal. 1991)261 Id. at 588.
262 Id. at 587-88.
263 Id. at 588.
264 Id. at 592-93 (citing CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§§ 11475.1 & 11350.1 (current version at CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 17404(a) (2001))).265 Id. at 594.
266 id.
267 id.
268 Id The court rejected the notion that allowing the
district attorney to litigate the exemption issue on behalf of
the custodial parent placed the district attorney in a
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problematic attorney-client relationship with the custodial
parent. Id. The court noted that the statute empowers the
district attorney to establish, modify and enforce support
matters in the name of the county and on behalf of the child
or parent, stating that "[n]otwithstanding the collateral
benefit to the custodial parent, the 'client' in such actions
remains the county." Id. at 595.
269 Id. The dissent cited Article I, Section 7 subdivision
(a) of the California Constitution. In its analysis, the
dissenting justice cited Anderson v. Superior Court, a case
in which a pro se custodial parent appeared as a witness in a
IV-D case initiated by the county against the non-custodial
parent. Id. at 595-96. Based on the custodial parent's
testimony, the lower court took action against the custodial
parent and ordered her to participate in a workfare program
or engage in a job search in order to avoid a reduction of
public assistance benefits. Id. at 596. The Court of Appeals
in Anderson considered the factors set forth in Mathews v.
Eldridge and ordered the lower court to vacate its order,
finding that because the custodial parent had not been
joined as a party, the action the court took against her




273 Id. at 596-97.
274 Id. at 597.
275Id. at 592. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 17404(d) (2001).
276 See infra Parts V.2.B & C.
277 See supra Part 111.2.
278 See supra V.1.
279 Res judicata prohibits a person from asserting the
same claim or cause of action in a subsequent action.
PIERCE, supra note 237, at 902-03. Collateral estoppel,
often referred to as issue preclusion, prohibits a person from
relitigating issues that were previously adjudicated, even
though the new case involves a different claim or cause of
action. Id. (citing Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351,
352-53 (1876)) (noting that res judicata is "an absolute bar
to a subsequent action" but "where the second action . . . is
upon a different claim ... the judgment in the prior action
operates as an estoppel only to those matters in issue or
points controverted, upon the determination of which the
finding or verdict was rendered.").
280 The notion that a custodial parent should be estopped
from pursuing an action because she could have intervened
in the previous litigation presumes that an individual has
access to legal counsel who can inform the party of her
option to intervene. In child support actions brought by the
state IV-D agency, custodians are frequently low-income
parties who have little or no access to private legal
assistance.
28! See WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 210, Vol. 7
§ 1601 (3d ed.) (citing Thompson v. Wing, 637 N.E.2d 917,
923 (Ohio 1994)); Howell v. Richardson, 544 N.E.2d 878,
881 (Ohio, 1989); Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins,
310 U.S. 381, 402 (1940):
Where the issues in separate suits are the same, the
fact that the parties are not precisely identical is not
necessarily fatal. As stated in Chicago, Rock Island &
Pacific Railway Co. v. Schendel, 270 U.S. 611, 620
... 'Identity of parties is not a mere matter of form,
but of substance. Parties nominally the same may be,
in legal effect, different . . . and parties nominally
different may be, in legal effect, the same.' A
judgment is res judicata in a second action upon the
same claim between the same parties or those in
privity with them.
282 Turner v. Butler, 537 S.E.2d 703, 705 (Ga. Ct. App.
2001).
283 Id.
285 Id. The mother had been the sole provider for the child
for approximately nine years. Id. at 704. She then applied
for public assistance and received benefits for approxi-
mately one year. Id. The state agency brought a child
support action during the period in which the mother was
receiving benefits. Id.
286 Id. at 705.
287 Id. at 704, 706. But see Miller v. Charles, 439 S.E.2d
88, 88 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993). Plaintiff brought suit against
the defendant, seeking establishment of paternity and
support. Miller, 439 S.E.2d at 88. The defendant argued that
the suit should be barred by res judicata because the state
IV-D agency had previously brought an action seeking
child support in which another man acknowledged
paternity. Id. The Court of Appeals found that the state
agency's interest was "not co-extensive or fully congruent
with" the mother's or child's interest in seeking to establish
paternity. Id. at 89. Therefore, the court held that neither the
mother nor the child were privy with the state agency and
therefore, the mother's subsequent action was not barred.
Id.
288 Lohman v. Flynn, 78 P.3d 379, 388 (Idaho 2003).
289 Id. at 381
290 Id. at 382. Res judicata is generally an affirmative
defense raised by the defendant but the court can also raise
this issue on its own. See, e.g., D.F. v. Dep't of Revenue ex
rel. L.F., 736 So. 2d 782, 786 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
291 Lohman, 78 P.3d at 389. The court explained that res
judicata bars a subsequent action between identical parties
trying to litigate a claim when a final judgment previously
rendered addresses the same claim. Id. at 386. The court
emphasized that relitigation of claims previously
adjudicated as well as subsequent litigation of claims that
are related to the previous claim that were raised or could
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299 Id. at 387-88.
300 Id. at 388. But see State of Oregon ex. rel. Moran v.
Rushman, 33 P.3d 999, 1001 (Or. Ct. App. 2001). The
Oregon Court of Appeals found that the state was not
precluded from initiating a paternity and support action
even though a previous divorce judgment existed in which
the court had found that there were no children born to the
marriage. Id. at 1000. The court reasoned that because the
state was not a party to the previous divorce action nor was
it in privity with either party, the state had the right to
initiate a paternity and support action on its own behalf. Id.
at 1001.
301 Lohman, 78 P.3d at 389. In some states, res judicata or
collateral estoppel only prevents the custodial parent from
relitigating claims or issues if the custodial parent assigned
her rights to the IV-D agency or if she was joined as a
party. See DOUGLAS J. BESHAROV, PRACTICE
COMMENTARIES TO N.Y. FAM. LAW § 522 (citing Simone
Q. v. Wayne R, 135 A.D.2d 944 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987)).
302 PIERCE, supra note 237, at 888 (citing Univ. of Tenn.
v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 798 (1986), United States v. Utah
Construction & Mining Co., 387 U.S. 394, 422 (1966)).
303 See id. at 890 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS).
304 Id.
301 Id. at 891 (citing Kleenwell Biohazard Waste v.
Nelson, 48 F.3d 391, 394-95 (9th Cir. 1995)). In Kleenwell,
the court applied res judicata to findings in an
administrative adjudication in which an administrative law
judge conducted the hearing, and the parties had an
opportunity to present evidence, cross-examine adverse
witnesses, and file briefs. Id.
306 See PIERCE, supra note 237, at 909. However, some
courts have recognized that res judicata in an administrative
setting may be more malleable than in a judicial context. Id.
at 893. For example, the Third Circuit stated that when
claimants typically do not have counsel to represent them,
rigid application of res judicata principles "must be
tempered by fairness and equity." Id. at 893 (quoting Purter
v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 682, 691 (3d Cir. 1985)).
307 See Id. at 898 (noting that the legislature may enact an
exception to the common law res judicata standards).
California had a statute expressly authorizing a custodial or
non-custodial parent to relitigate child support issues
previously raised in an action brought by the IV-D agency.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11350.1 (2000). However, that
statute has since been repealed and is codified in its current
form at CAL. FAM. CODE § 17404(d) (2001).
308 See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 17404(d) (nothing in the
statute "prevents parties from bringing an independent
action under other provisions of this code and litigating the
issues of support, custody, visitation, or protective orders").
309 id.
3 10 id.
31 45 C.F.R. §§ 302.70(a)(9)(iii) & 303.106(a)(3) (2006).
312 Id. §§ 302.70(a)(9)(iii) & 303.106(a)(3).
313 See id. § 303.106.
314 Id. § 303.106(b)(a)(3). Modification may take effect
for "any period during which there is pending a petition for
modification, but only from the date that notice of such
petition has been given, either directly or through the
appropriate agent, to the obligee." Id. In other words, a
court or administrative tribunal can issue a prospective
modification and order that the modified amount be paid
beginning from the date that the non-custodial parent or
obligee received notice of the petition for modification.
315 If the court determines that a party must be joined as a
plaintiff and the individual refuses to be joined or is hostile
to the interests of the original plaintiff, then the court may
join that person as a defendant. FRIEDENTHAL, KANE &
MILLER, supra note 187, at 361. In some circumstances, the
court will not be able to join the nonparty because the court
does not have personal jurisdiction, joinder will defeat
subject matter jurisdiction, or the nonparty objects to venue.
Id. at 357. If one of these circumstances arises, the court
must decide whether, "in equity and good conscience," it
can proceed without the nonparty or whether the nonparty
is indispensable to the action, thus requiring the court to
must dismiss the case in his or her absence. Id. Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 19(b) lays out a four-part test that a court
must use to determine whether a party is indispensable but
generally, courts will try to avoid dismissal of an action
based on nonjoinder. FED. R. CIv. P. 19(b). See also
FRIEDENTHAL, KANE & MILLER, supra note 187, at 362-63.
A court must determine (1) whether a judgment issued in
the absence of the individual will prejudice the person to be
joined or other parties; (2) whether the court can reduce or
eliminate prejudice or other negative effects of nonjoinder
by fashioning other relief or remedies; (3) whether a
judgment issued without joinder will be adequate; and
(4) the costs to the plaintiff of a dismissal for nonjoinder.
Id. at 362-64.
316 OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.015 & 416.407(1)(2). See also
id. § 137-055-1040.
317 See supra Part IV.1.
318 42 U.S.C. § 666 (2006); 45 C.F.R. § 302.70 (2006).
319 Such legislative action would be in line with the
Uniform Parentage Act (2002), which requires that the
natural mother be made a party to all paternity actions. See
Memorandum from Paula Roberts, Ctr. for Law and Soc.
Policy, to Interested People, Update on the Uniform
Parentage Act (2002) (Apr. 15, 2005), available at <http'/
www.clasp.org/publications/uniformparentage.pdf.>
At least six states have enacted a version of the Uniform
Parentage Act: Delaware, Washington, Texas, North
Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming. Id. at 1.
320 There are many reasons a custodial parent may not
want the government to pursue support. For example, the
non-custodial parent may have been violent or abusive but
the custodial parent cannot provide sufficient evidence to
qualify for an exemption from cooperation. Conversely, the
custodial parent may have a positive relationship with the
father who provides in-kind support for the family or
spends significant time with the child and she fears that
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pursuing support could damage that relationship. If the
custodial parent is listed as a plaintiff, the non-custodial
parent might believe that the custodial parent is pushing the
government to pursue child support from him when, in fact,
it is the government that has taken this action.
321 As discussed in Part V.2.A, such notice could be
effectuated by first class mail to the address provided by the
custodial parent.
322 OR. REV. STAT. § 416.415(2)(f) (2006).
323 WYOMING GUIDE, supra note 178, at 2.
324 See WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 210, at
139.
325 Most custodians receiving child support services from
IV-D agencies do not have private attorneys assisting them.
It is highly unlikely that pro se parties will know that they
have a right to request that they be permitted to intervene
and join in the case unless the judge or the agency explains




330 OCSE ATTORNEY HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 38.
331 Id. at 37.
332 Id. at 37-38.
333 Id. at 37.
334 Florida Application, supra note 174 (emphasis added).
311 OCSE ATTORNEY HANDBOOK, supra note 7 (warning
of this potential problem).
336 Child Support Fact Sheet, supra note 33.
337 Several commentators have suggested that the current
child support system does not provide an effective vehicle
for bringing families out of poverty, particularly in cases
involving low-income non-custodial parents. See, e.g.,
Murphy, supra note 38, at 351-65.
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